Two recent cases out of the Third Circuit and the Southern District of New York highlight some of the developing formulas US courts are using when engaging with foreign debtors. In a case out of the Third Circuit, Vertivv. Wayne Burt, the court expanded on factors to be considered when deciding whether international comity requires the dismissal of US civil claims that impact foreign insolvency proceedings.
Introduction
The first stage in any restructuring by way of a scheme of arrangement in the Cayman Islands involves meetings of such classes of creditors or shareholders (as the case may be) to consider, and if thought fit, approve the terms of the scheme. An application to Court is required for orders to be granted for convening such meetings. If, at these meetings, the requisite statutory majorities are satisfied, the second stage involves obtaining Court sanction for the proposed scheme to become effective.
Bermuda, the British Virgin Islands and the Cayman Islands all have legislation that enables a company to present a scheme of arrangement to restructure its debts.
One of the defining features of a scheme of arrangement carried out under the relevant legislation in each jurisdiction is the ability to cram down dissenting creditors or members (or classes of them, as the case may be) if the requisite statutory majorities are satisfied and Court sanction of the proposed scheme is obtained.
When a majority of a company’s board approves a tender offer in good faith, can it still be avoided as an actually fraudulent transfer? Yes, says the Delaware Bankruptcy Court, holding that the fraudulent intent of a corporation’s CEO who was a board member and exercised control over the board can be imputed to the corporation, even if he was the sole actor with fraudulent intent.
Background
A recent judgment of the United Kingdom Supreme Court in Brake & Anor v The Chedington Court Estate Ltd [2023] UKSC 29 (10 August 2023) is likely to be a welcome decision for liquidators and trustees in bankruptcy in setting clear boundaries as to who has standing to challenge their decision-making in corporate or personal insolvency contexts.
Recently, in In re Moon Group Inc., a bankruptcy court said no, but the district court, which has agreed to review the decision on an interlocutory appeal, seems far less sure.
Yes, says the Delaware Bankruptcy Court in the case of CII Parent, Inc., cementing the advice routinely given by bankruptcy counsel to borrowers in default. We always counsel borrower clients in default of the risk associated with lenders taking unilateral actions pre-filing, stripping debtors of valuable options and assets. Thus, we normally recommend to always obtain a forbearance and undertake the preparations required to file a bankruptcy petition immediately upon forbearance termination, although whether or not to file depends on variety of factors that should be considered.
The Second Circuit recently held that a non-party to an assumed executory contract is not entitled to a cure payment (although it may be so entitled if is a third-party beneficiary of the contract). The result would have seemed obvious to bankruptcy practitioners. So, what in the world made the party pursuing payment take this to the Second Circuit? Well, surprisingly, as the Second Circuit decision shows, the answer is not found in the plain text of the Bankruptcy Code. And while it was argued prior to the Supreme Court’s ruling in Bartenwerfer v. Buckley, No. 21-908, 598 U.S.
A mortgage loan repurchase facility (more casually referred to as a "repo") is a financing structure commonly utilized to finance mortgage loans. These facilities are utilized by both residential and commercial mortgage loan originators and aggregators to finance mortgage loans that they originate or acquire. The structure is favored by liquidity providers in the mortgage loan finance arena due to its preferential "safe harbor" treatment under the United States Bankruptcy Code (the "Bankruptcy Code"), as further described below.
Lenders often attempt to limit what a borrower can do outside the ordinary course of business by negotiating contractual protections. Some of these provisions are designed to make the borrowers bankruptcy remote by, for example, requiring the borrower’s Board to include an independent director whose consent is required for a bankruptcy filing. Others, as was the case we discuss here, however, go further by including contractual rights that limit a borrower’s ability to file for bankruptcy without the lender’s consent.