Overview

Payment Orders were originally introduced in the CPC as a fast track route for creditors holding a financial instrument, such as a letter of credit or cheque, to obtain judgment against their debtor for what is a simple and indisputable debt. Payment Orders were rarely issued by the onshore UAE courts. In 2018, Cabinet Resolution No 57 of 2018 (the “2018 Cabinet Resolution”) significantly expanded the scope of application of Payment Orders by extending them to all admitted debts rather than simply those arising out of financial instruments only.

The widespread reach of the coronavirus (“Covid-19”) outbreak has unfavorably impacted numerous industries all over the world and sent shock waves across the global financial markets. As the outbreak has spread globally, a growing list of some of the world’s biggest companies have started to warn markets about the adverse impact the Covid-19 outbreak will have on their results and financial condition.

“[C]ourts may account for hypothetical preference actions within a hypothetical [C]hapter 7 liquidation” to hold a defendant bank (“Bank”) liable for a payment it received within 90 days of a debtor’s bankruptcy, held the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit on March 7, 2017.In re Tenderloin Health, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 4008, *4 (9th Cir. March 7, 2017).

Section 316(b) of the Trust Indenture Act of 1939 (“TIA”) provides that, subject to certain exceptions, the right of a holder of an indenture security to receive principal and interest payments, or to institute suit to enforce such payments after they become due, shall not be impaired or affected without such holder’s consent. Market participants had long viewed Section 316(b) of the TIA as a “boilerplate” provision, contained or incorporated by reference in most high yield indentures, that protected only a bondholder’s right to bring suit to enforce payment obligations.

The Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure (“Bankruptcy Rules”) require each corporate party in an adversary proceeding (i.e., a bankruptcy court suit) to file a statement identifying the holders of “10% or more” of the party’s equity interests. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7007.1(a). Bankruptcy Judge Martin Glenn, relying on another local Bankruptcy Rule (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. R.

A Chapter 11 debtor “cannot nullify a preexisting obligation in a loan agreement to pay post-default interest solely by proposing a cure,” held a split panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit on Nov. 4, 2016. In re New Investments Inc., 2016 WL 6543520, *3 (9th Cir. Nov. 4, 2016) (2-1).

While a recent federal bankruptcy court ruling provides some clarity as to how midstream gathering agreements may be treated in Chapter 11 cases involving oil and gas exploration and production companies (“E&Ps”), there are still many questions that remain. This Alert analyzes and answers 10 important questions raised by the In re Sabine Oil & Gas Corporation decision of March 8, 2016.[1]

An asset purchaser’s payments into segregated accounts for the benefit of general unsecured creditors and professionals employed by the debtor (i.e., the seller) and its creditors’ committee, made in connection with the purchase of all of the debtor’s assets, are not property of the debtor’s estate or available for distribution to creditors according to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit — even when some of the segregated accounts were listed as consideration in the governing asset purchase agreement. ICL Holding Company, Inc., et al. v.

Bankruptcy courts may hear state law disputes “when the parties knowingly and voluntarily consent,” held the U.S. Supreme Court on May 26, 2015. Wellness Int’l Network Ltd. v. Sharif, 2015 WL 2456619, at *3 (May 26, 2015). That consent, moreover, need not be express, reasoned the Court. Id. at *9 (“Nothing in the Constitution requires that consent to adjudication by a bankruptcy court be express.”). Reversing the U.S.