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“以房抵债”安排,原常见于缓解开发商在开发过程中少量资金短缺的问题,但部分房地产企业逐渐将其演化作为平衡资金需求的工具,签订大量的“以房抵债”协议,在出现现金流危机、甚至濒临破产的情况下,无力偿还欠款,也无力建完房屋交付债权人,使得“以房抵债”的实现问题变得愈加尖锐。而在理论和实践中,“以房抵债”也存在较多的争议,即便表面上均具备相似的特征,由于个案事实细微的差别,或是裁判观点不同,导致不同的判决结果。故此,本文拟就“以房抵债”在破产程序中可能面临的不同效果进行梳理及探讨。

一、关于“以房抵债”的法律关系的厘清

实践中关于“以房抵债”存在着各种各样的约定,归纳起来,最为常见的为“以物抵债”类型的安排:通常发生在债务到期后(部分案件中可能发生在债务到期前),即以债务人或他人持有的房屋作为抵偿债务的“物”,通过折价转让给债权人的形式,实现债务清偿的目的。该种抵偿改变了原债权金钱给付的方式,在理论上,可称为“他种给付型以房抵债”。

“[C]ourts may account for hypothetical preference actions within a hypothetical [C]hapter 7 liquidation” to hold a defendant bank (“Bank”) liable for a payment it received within 90 days of a debtor’s bankruptcy, held the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit on March 7, 2017.In re Tenderloin Health, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 4008, *4 (9th Cir. March 7, 2017).

The Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure (“Bankruptcy Rules”) require each corporate party in an adversary proceeding (i.e., a bankruptcy court suit) to file a statement identifying the holders of “10% or more” of the party’s equity interests. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7007.1(a). Bankruptcy Judge Martin Glenn, relying on another local Bankruptcy Rule (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. R.

A Chapter 11 debtor “cannot nullify a preexisting obligation in a loan agreement to pay post-default interest solely by proposing a cure,” held a split panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit on Nov. 4, 2016. In re New Investments Inc., 2016 WL 6543520, *3 (9th Cir. Nov. 4, 2016) (2-1).

While a recent federal bankruptcy court ruling provides some clarity as to how midstream gathering agreements may be treated in Chapter 11 cases involving oil and gas exploration and production companies (“E&Ps”), there are still many questions that remain. This Alert analyzes and answers 10 important questions raised by the In re Sabine Oil & Gas Corporation decision of March 8, 2016.[1]

An asset purchaser’s payments into segregated accounts for the benefit of general unsecured creditors and professionals employed by the debtor (i.e., the seller) and its creditors’ committee, made in connection with the purchase of all of the debtor’s assets, are not property of the debtor’s estate or available for distribution to creditors according to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit — even when some of the segregated accounts were listed as consideration in the governing asset purchase agreement. ICL Holding Company, Inc., et al. v.

Bankruptcy courts may hear state law disputes “when the parties knowingly and voluntarily consent,” held the U.S. Supreme Court on May 26, 2015. Wellness Int’l Network Ltd. v. Sharif, 2015 WL 2456619, at *3 (May 26, 2015). That consent, moreover, need not be express, reasoned the Court. Id. at *9 (“Nothing in the Constitution requires that consent to adjudication by a bankruptcy court be express.”). Reversing the U.S.

Following the Dec. 8 publication by the American Bankruptcy Institute (“ABI”) Commission to Study the Reform of Chapter 11 of a report (the “Report”) recommending changes to Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code (“Code”),[1] we continue to analyze the proposals contained in the ABI’s 400-page Report. One proposal we wanted to immediately highlight would, if adopted, significantly increase the risk profile for secured lenders.

Setoff provisions are commonly found in a variety of trading related agreements between hedge funds and their dealer counterparties. Last November, Judge Christopher Sontchi of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware held that “triangular setoff” is not enforceable in the context of a bankruptcy case.[1] “Triangular setoff” is a contractual right of setoff that permits one party (“Party One”) to net and set off contractual claims of Party One and its affiliated entities  against another party (“Party Two”).

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held on July 30, 2013, that a reorganized Chapter 11 debtor could reopen its closed case, enabling the debtor assignee to enforce a purchase option in a real property lease despite the lease’s “anti-assignment provisions.” In re Lazy Days’ RV Center Inc., 2013 WL 3886735, *5 (3d Cir. July 30, 2013).