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过去数年,打包重组(Repackaging)结构盛行,中资金融机构寻求使用其作为便利进入市场的工具,并为客户提供创新的融资方案。

中国房地产行业是最广泛使用该结构的行业之一,该行业在2021年高开低走、大起大跌,并于最后一季急挫。市场预期房地产行业在2022年仍将困难重重。

在此背景下,我们察觉到安排人(Arranger)、中国房地产企业及投资者正在寻求对现有的打包重组交易进行结构调整(restructure)的机会(包括提前终止、展期、增加额外增信措施、置换等安排)。此外,我们还观察到,市场对与中国非房地产行业主体(如融资租赁公司、金融科技公司)相关的资产支持交易的兴趣有所增加。

我们将于本文探讨部分有关修订或提前终止打包重组交易的主要问题,并且概述我们在市场中观察到的典型案例和未来趋势。

温故知新:打包重组交易的基本结构

许多较为简单的打包重组交易的结构一般具有下列特点:

“[C]ourts may account for hypothetical preference actions within a hypothetical [C]hapter 7 liquidation” to hold a defendant bank (“Bank”) liable for a payment it received within 90 days of a debtor’s bankruptcy, held the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit on March 7, 2017.In re Tenderloin Health, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 4008, *4 (9th Cir. March 7, 2017).

2017年1月07日,在《人民法院报》最新公布的 “2016年度人民法院十大民事行政案件”中,金杜律师事务所代理的江苏舜天船舶股份有限公司(简称“舜天船舶”)破产重整案名列其中。该案不仅是适用最高人民法院和证监会之间会商机制的首个案例,也是上市公司重整同时完成重大资产重组的首个案例,在案件处理的参考性以及对于市场和社会的整体影响方面均意义重大。每年由《人民法院报》编辑部评出的十大案件均为在过去一年中全国各级法院审判的具有重大社会影响力、案情疑难复杂或审判结果有重大突破和借鉴作用的典型案件。

舜天船舶是一家从事船舶和非船舶贸易的国有控股上市公司。受航运及船舶市场持续低迷的影响,自2014年起舜天船舶的经营危机和债务危机开始显现,且日趋严重,渐至资不抵债,面临严峻的退市风险。最终舜天船舶于2016年2月5日被南京市中级人民法院(简称“南京中院”)裁定进入破产重整程序。南京中院通过公开选任方式,经过层层选拔,最终确定金杜为本案管理人,负责开展相关重整工作。

The Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure (“Bankruptcy Rules”) require each corporate party in an adversary proceeding (i.e., a bankruptcy court suit) to file a statement identifying the holders of “10% or more” of the party’s equity interests. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7007.1(a). Bankruptcy Judge Martin Glenn, relying on another local Bankruptcy Rule (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. R.

A Chapter 11 debtor “cannot nullify a preexisting obligation in a loan agreement to pay post-default interest solely by proposing a cure,” held a split panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit on Nov. 4, 2016. In re New Investments Inc., 2016 WL 6543520, *3 (9th Cir. Nov. 4, 2016) (2-1).

While a recent federal bankruptcy court ruling provides some clarity as to how midstream gathering agreements may be treated in Chapter 11 cases involving oil and gas exploration and production companies (“E&Ps”), there are still many questions that remain. This Alert analyzes and answers 10 important questions raised by the In re Sabine Oil & Gas Corporation decision of March 8, 2016.[1]

An asset purchaser’s payments into segregated accounts for the benefit of general unsecured creditors and professionals employed by the debtor (i.e., the seller) and its creditors’ committee, made in connection with the purchase of all of the debtor’s assets, are not property of the debtor’s estate or available for distribution to creditors according to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit — even when some of the segregated accounts were listed as consideration in the governing asset purchase agreement. ICL Holding Company, Inc., et al. v.

Bankruptcy courts may hear state law disputes “when the parties knowingly and voluntarily consent,” held the U.S. Supreme Court on May 26, 2015. Wellness Int’l Network Ltd. v. Sharif, 2015 WL 2456619, at *3 (May 26, 2015). That consent, moreover, need not be express, reasoned the Court. Id. at *9 (“Nothing in the Constitution requires that consent to adjudication by a bankruptcy court be express.”). Reversing the U.S.

Following the Dec. 8 publication by the American Bankruptcy Institute (“ABI”) Commission to Study the Reform of Chapter 11 of a report (the “Report”) recommending changes to Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code (“Code”),[1] we continue to analyze the proposals contained in the ABI’s 400-page Report. One proposal we wanted to immediately highlight would, if adopted, significantly increase the risk profile for secured lenders.

Setoff provisions are commonly found in a variety of trading related agreements between hedge funds and their dealer counterparties. Last November, Judge Christopher Sontchi of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware held that “triangular setoff” is not enforceable in the context of a bankruptcy case.[1] “Triangular setoff” is a contractual right of setoff that permits one party (“Party One”) to net and set off contractual claims of Party One and its affiliated entities  against another party (“Party Two”).