在经济下行的时候，原来一些质地不错的企业也会陷入困境。对于困境企业而言，通过破产重整焕发生机，也许是最后一根救命稻草；对于投资人而言，未来真正的赚钱机会，也将出现在更多、更复杂的破产重整项目中。今天，我想跟大家谈谈破产重整投资的趋势、挑战与未来。

一、重整投资的趋势

首先，我们来谈谈重整投资已经展现出的四个变化趋势。

第一个趋势，是从被动投资到主动投资。

什么是被动投资？以往一些破产项目中的重整投资人，往往本身就是破产企业的债权人，他们随着陷入危机的破产企业一起被困在了“水中”，不得不通过参与重整投资寻求最后的“上岸”机会，比较典型的就是一些作为困境企业债权人的AMC公司。

什么是主动投资？这几年里，逐渐有一些“岸上的人”也瞄准了重整投资领域。“岸上的人”，是与困境企业没有关系的外部投资人，他们没有受到困境企业的牵连，而是将重整投资视作一个宝贵的商业机会，主动参与其中。这样的“岸上投资人”，既包括产业投资人，也包括财务投资人。

1. 最实在的权利 清算优先权，或优先清算权(Liquidation Preference)，是指“清算事件”发生时，投资人在清算财产分配过程中享有优先顺位的权利。通常，越晚进来的投资人清算优先的顺位越高，但在老投资人强势时也可能会约定新老投资人之间平等顺位，按投资金额比例甚至股权比例分优先金额。相比实际上基本用不上的分红优先权，清算优先权是更实用、也更可能给投资人创造实际价值的经济权利。

2. 好坏通吃 清算优先权可以在公司情况不佳(downside)时让投资人优先拿回一点补偿，也可以在公司获得好的收购机会(upside)时使得投资人获利更多。

3. 只是清算？ 如果“清算事件”仅包括法律意义上的清算(例如公司解散或破产时的清算)，那实际用途不大，关键是它还包括“视同清算事件”。“视同清算事件”的情形通常包括导致控制权变更的合并、收购，以及出售、租赁、转让、以排他性许可或其他方式处置公司全部或大部分资产的事件。考虑到解散或破产清算时公司多半已经没有太多资产可分，发生并购事件才是清算优先权最大的用武之地。

“[C]ourts may account for hypothetical preference actions within a hypothetical [C]hapter 7 liquidation” to hold a defendant bank (“Bank”) liable for a payment it received within 90 days of a debtor’s bankruptcy, held the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit on March 7, 2017.In re Tenderloin Health, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 4008, *4 (9th Cir. March 7, 2017).

The Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure (“Bankruptcy Rules”) require each corporate party in an adversary proceeding (i.e., a bankruptcy court suit) to file a statement identifying the holders of “10% or more” of the party’s equity interests. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7007.1(a). Bankruptcy Judge Martin Glenn, relying on another local Bankruptcy Rule (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. R.

A Chapter 11 debtor “cannot nullify a preexisting obligation in a loan agreement to pay post-default interest solely by proposing a cure,” held a split panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit on Nov. 4, 2016. In re New Investments Inc., 2016 WL 6543520, *3 (9th Cir. Nov. 4, 2016) (2-1).

While a recent federal bankruptcy court ruling provides some clarity as to how midstream gathering agreements may be treated in Chapter 11 cases involving oil and gas exploration and production companies (“E&Ps”), there are still many questions that remain. This Alert analyzes and answers 10 important questions raised by the In re Sabine Oil & Gas Corporation decision of March 8, 2016.[1]

An asset purchaser’s payments into segregated accounts for the benefit of general unsecured creditors and professionals employed by the debtor (i.e., the seller) and its creditors’ committee, made in connection with the purchase of all of the debtor’s assets, are not property of the debtor’s estate or available for distribution to creditors according to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit — even when some of the segregated accounts were listed as consideration in the governing asset purchase agreement. ICL Holding Company, Inc., et al. v.

Bankruptcy courts may hear state law disputes “when the parties knowingly and voluntarily consent,” held the U.S. Supreme Court on May 26, 2015. Wellness Int’l Network Ltd. v. Sharif, 2015 WL 2456619, at *3 (May 26, 2015). That consent, moreover, need not be express, reasoned the Court. Id. at *9 (“Nothing in the Constitution requires that consent to adjudication by a bankruptcy court be express.”). Reversing the U.S.

Following the Dec. 8 publication by the American Bankruptcy Institute (“ABI”) Commission to Study the Reform of Chapter 11 of a report (the “Report”) recommending changes to Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code (“Code”),[1] we continue to analyze the proposals contained in the ABI’s 400-page Report. One proposal we wanted to immediately highlight would, if adopted, significantly increase the risk profile for secured lenders.

Setoff provisions are commonly found in a variety of trading related agreements between hedge funds and their dealer counterparties. Last November, Judge Christopher Sontchi of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware held that “triangular setoff” is not enforceable in the context of a bankruptcy case.[1] “Triangular setoff” is a contractual right of setoff that permits one party (“Party One”) to net and set off contractual claims of Party One and its affiliated entities  against another party (“Party Two”).