近年来，我国宏观经济增长放缓，国家调整产业和信贷政策，并逐渐加强金融监管，商业银行的资产质量压力有所增加，十亿甚至百亿级别的债务逾期或潜在违约浮出水面。这些巨无霸级别的潜在不良贷款风险，迫切要求商业银行审查并改善贷前贷后管理中的遗漏和问题，也对商业银行的危机处理能力提出了更高的挑战。

大敌当前，痛定思痛，当危机来临时，商业银行的管理层和执行层需要的是冷静的思考、周密的策划，以及必要时刻壮士断腕的决策力。从本团队近期参与处理的几项复杂的债务逾期及潜在违约案例来看，危机的表象多种多样，除了资金周转困难带来直接的偿付危机；有的则是债务人控制人挪用公司资金投入股市炒股，有的是公司实际控制人陷入刑事调查和指控，也有的则更为隐蔽，债务人关联主体在境外受到他国政府的调查等等。这些危机虽然不一定直接表现为到期不付，但可能已经导致债务人违反融资文件的陈述、承诺条款，甚至通过交叉违约触发了违约事件或潜在违约事件。

本文旨在梳理危机处理的思路，通盘策划全面追索资产的策略，为贷款管理工作层面制定一份简介易行的“工作方案”，以便为后续的债务重组和清偿争取宝贵的时间，避免弯路：

一、梳理融资文件

As the Chinese economy enters the “new normal”, the Chinese government has been adjusting its industrial and credit-related policies and strengthening regulation of Chinese financial institutions. A large number of non-performing loans (NPLs) as well as actual loan defaults have started to surface. The risks associated with rising levels of NPLs require Chinese banks to enhance their ex ante and ex post credit risk management practices.

“[C]ourts may account for hypothetical preference actions within a hypothetical [C]hapter 7 liquidation” to hold a defendant bank (“Bank”) liable for a payment it received within 90 days of a debtor’s bankruptcy, held the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit on March 7, 2017.In re Tenderloin Health, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 4008, *4 (9th Cir. March 7, 2017).

The Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure (“Bankruptcy Rules”) require each corporate party in an adversary proceeding (i.e., a bankruptcy court suit) to file a statement identifying the holders of “10% or more” of the party’s equity interests. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7007.1(a). Bankruptcy Judge Martin Glenn, relying on another local Bankruptcy Rule (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. R.

A Chapter 11 debtor “cannot nullify a preexisting obligation in a loan agreement to pay post-default interest solely by proposing a cure,” held a split panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit on Nov. 4, 2016. In re New Investments Inc., 2016 WL 6543520, *3 (9th Cir. Nov. 4, 2016) (2-1).

While a recent federal bankruptcy court ruling provides some clarity as to how midstream gathering agreements may be treated in Chapter 11 cases involving oil and gas exploration and production companies (“E&Ps”), there are still many questions that remain. This Alert analyzes and answers 10 important questions raised by the In re Sabine Oil & Gas Corporation decision of March 8, 2016.[1]

An asset purchaser’s payments into segregated accounts for the benefit of general unsecured creditors and professionals employed by the debtor (i.e., the seller) and its creditors’ committee, made in connection with the purchase of all of the debtor’s assets, are not property of the debtor’s estate or available for distribution to creditors according to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit — even when some of the segregated accounts were listed as consideration in the governing asset purchase agreement. ICL Holding Company, Inc., et al. v.

Bankruptcy courts may hear state law disputes “when the parties knowingly and voluntarily consent,” held the U.S. Supreme Court on May 26, 2015. Wellness Int’l Network Ltd. v. Sharif, 2015 WL 2456619, at *3 (May 26, 2015). That consent, moreover, need not be express, reasoned the Court. Id. at *9 (“Nothing in the Constitution requires that consent to adjudication by a bankruptcy court be express.”). Reversing the U.S.

Following the Dec. 8 publication by the American Bankruptcy Institute (“ABI”) Commission to Study the Reform of Chapter 11 of a report (the “Report”) recommending changes to Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code (“Code”),[1] we continue to analyze the proposals contained in the ABI’s 400-page Report. One proposal we wanted to immediately highlight would, if adopted, significantly increase the risk profile for secured lenders.

Setoff provisions are commonly found in a variety of trading related agreements between hedge funds and their dealer counterparties. Last November, Judge Christopher Sontchi of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware held that “triangular setoff” is not enforceable in the context of a bankruptcy case.[1] “Triangular setoff” is a contractual right of setoff that permits one party (“Party One”) to net and set off contractual claims of Party One and its affiliated entities  against another party (“Party Two”).