The Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia has become the first appellate court among ratifying countries to look directly at the meaning of “give possession” and “giving possession of the aircraft object to the creditor” under the Protocol to the Convention on International Interests in Mobile Equipment (known as the Cape Town Convention) on matters specific to Aircraft Equipment (the Protocol) in the context of an insolvency (the Virgin Australia insolvency) in Wells Fargo Trust Company, National Association (trustee) v VB Leaseco Pty Ltd (admin

The UK has introduced a new restructuring tool, the Restructuring Plan, which when coupled with other provisions of the new law creates the possibility of the management of a company in financial difficulty remaining in control of a process designed to turn the company around as a going concern whilst in many cases having the benefit of a moratorium. Sounds a little like Chapter 11 in the US?

We examine whether the Restructuring Plan will offer aviation companies in the UK (and elsewhere?) a potential route to deal with the difficulties caused by the COVID-19 pandemic.

Insolvency termination clauses in Supply Contracts

What are the potential implications of the new measures in relation to contracts for the supply of goods or services set out in the Corporate Insolvency and Governance Act 2020 (the “Act”) for aircraft lenders, lessors and airlines? In the second of a series of three articles, we consider the new prohibition on suppliers invoking termination clauses (or changing other terms) upon an insolvency or formal restructuring process introduced in the Act.

The new moratorium regime

What are the potential implications of the new moratorium regime set out in the Corporate Insolvency and Governance Act 2020 (the “Act”) for aircraft lenders, lessors and airlines? In the first of a series of three articles, we consider this new law.

“[C]ourts may account for hypothetical preference actions within a hypothetical [C]hapter 7 liquidation” to hold a defendant bank (“Bank”) liable for a payment it received within 90 days of a debtor’s bankruptcy, held the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit on March 7, 2017.In re Tenderloin Health, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 4008, *4 (9th Cir. March 7, 2017).

The Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure (“Bankruptcy Rules”) require each corporate party in an adversary proceeding (i.e., a bankruptcy court suit) to file a statement identifying the holders of “10% or more” of the party’s equity interests. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7007.1(a). Bankruptcy Judge Martin Glenn, relying on another local Bankruptcy Rule (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. R.

A Chapter 11 debtor “cannot nullify a preexisting obligation in a loan agreement to pay post-default interest solely by proposing a cure,” held a split panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit on Nov. 4, 2016. In re New Investments Inc., 2016 WL 6543520, *3 (9th Cir. Nov. 4, 2016) (2-1).

While a recent federal bankruptcy court ruling provides some clarity as to how midstream gathering agreements may be treated in Chapter 11 cases involving oil and gas exploration and production companies (“E&Ps”), there are still many questions that remain. This Alert analyzes and answers 10 important questions raised by the In re Sabine Oil & Gas Corporation decision of March 8, 2016.[1]

An asset purchaser’s payments into segregated accounts for the benefit of general unsecured creditors and professionals employed by the debtor (i.e., the seller) and its creditors’ committee, made in connection with the purchase of all of the debtor’s assets, are not property of the debtor’s estate or available for distribution to creditors according to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit — even when some of the segregated accounts were listed as consideration in the governing asset purchase agreement. ICL Holding Company, Inc., et al. v.

Bankruptcy courts may hear state law disputes “when the parties knowingly and voluntarily consent,” held the U.S. Supreme Court on May 26, 2015. Wellness Int’l Network Ltd. v. Sharif, 2015 WL 2456619, at *3 (May 26, 2015). That consent, moreover, need not be express, reasoned the Court. Id. at *9 (“Nothing in the Constitution requires that consent to adjudication by a bankruptcy court be express.”). Reversing the U.S.