引子

将于2024年7月1日正式施行的《公司法》（以下简称“新《公司法》”）第二百三十二条对于“清算义务人”及“未及时履行清算义务责任”（以下简称“董事怠于清算责任”）进行了重大修订，无论是股份公司还是有限公司，董事都将成为法定的唯一清算义务人。该条规定的更新无疑将引发司法解释及其他配套规定的新一轮重大修改，并将再次对司法实践中本就争议颇多的怠于清算责任案件的裁判规则带来冲击。

引子

将于2024年7月1日正式施行的《公司法》（以下简称“《新公司法》”）第二百三十二条对于“清算义务人”及“怠于履行清算义务责任”（以下简称“怠于清算责任”）进行了重大修订，无论是股份公司还是有限公司，董事都将成为法定的唯一清算义务人。该条规定的更新无疑将引发司法解释及其他配套规定的新一轮重大修改，并将对司法实践中本就争议颇多的怠于清算责任案件的裁判规则再次带来冲击。

回望我国立法沿革，在超过三十年的时间中，对于“清算义务人”及“怠于清算责任”的规定修订之繁多、体系之冲突、解释之模糊，遍观整个民商事法律体系都属罕见，并由此引发了大量“类案不同判”的现象。鉴此，笔者将结合《新公司法》的最新修改，对涉及“清算义务人”和“怠于清算责任”的规定进行系统回顾及梳理，并以此为基础对《新公司法》的新修亮点及溯及力问题进行初步分析，抛砖引玉，并求教于业界。

一、《新公司法》之前我国法律对于“清算义务人”与“怠于清算责任”的立法沿革

（一）2005年《公司法》修订之前的相关规定

“[C]ourts may account for hypothetical preference actions within a hypothetical [C]hapter 7 liquidation” to hold a defendant bank (“Bank”) liable for a payment it received within 90 days of a debtor’s bankruptcy, held the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit on March 7, 2017.In re Tenderloin Health, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 4008, *4 (9th Cir. March 7, 2017).

The Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure (“Bankruptcy Rules”) require each corporate party in an adversary proceeding (i.e., a bankruptcy court suit) to file a statement identifying the holders of “10% or more” of the party’s equity interests. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7007.1(a). Bankruptcy Judge Martin Glenn, relying on another local Bankruptcy Rule (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. R.

A Chapter 11 debtor “cannot nullify a preexisting obligation in a loan agreement to pay post-default interest solely by proposing a cure,” held a split panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit on Nov. 4, 2016. In re New Investments Inc., 2016 WL 6543520, *3 (9th Cir. Nov. 4, 2016) (2-1).

While a recent federal bankruptcy court ruling provides some clarity as to how midstream gathering agreements may be treated in Chapter 11 cases involving oil and gas exploration and production companies (“E&Ps”), there are still many questions that remain. This Alert analyzes and answers 10 important questions raised by the In re Sabine Oil & Gas Corporation decision of March 8, 2016.[1]

An asset purchaser’s payments into segregated accounts for the benefit of general unsecured creditors and professionals employed by the debtor (i.e., the seller) and its creditors’ committee, made in connection with the purchase of all of the debtor’s assets, are not property of the debtor’s estate or available for distribution to creditors according to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit — even when some of the segregated accounts were listed as consideration in the governing asset purchase agreement. ICL Holding Company, Inc., et al. v.

Bankruptcy courts may hear state law disputes “when the parties knowingly and voluntarily consent,” held the U.S. Supreme Court on May 26, 2015. Wellness Int’l Network Ltd. v. Sharif, 2015 WL 2456619, at *3 (May 26, 2015). That consent, moreover, need not be express, reasoned the Court. Id. at *9 (“Nothing in the Constitution requires that consent to adjudication by a bankruptcy court be express.”). Reversing the U.S.

Following the Dec. 8 publication by the American Bankruptcy Institute (“ABI”) Commission to Study the Reform of Chapter 11 of a report (the “Report”) recommending changes to Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code (“Code”),[1] we continue to analyze the proposals contained in the ABI’s 400-page Report. One proposal we wanted to immediately highlight would, if adopted, significantly increase the risk profile for secured lenders.

Setoff provisions are commonly found in a variety of trading related agreements between hedge funds and their dealer counterparties. Last November, Judge Christopher Sontchi of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware held that “triangular setoff” is not enforceable in the context of a bankruptcy case.[1] “Triangular setoff” is a contractual right of setoff that permits one party (“Party One”) to net and set off contractual claims of Party One and its affiliated entities  against another party (“Party Two”).