“[C]ourts may account for hypothetical preference actions within a hypothetical [C]hapter 7 liquidation” to hold a defendant bank (“Bank”) liable for a payment it received within 90 days of a debtor’s bankruptcy, held the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit on March 7, 2017.In re Tenderloin Health, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 4008, *4 (9th Cir. March 7, 2017).

The Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure (“Bankruptcy Rules”) require each corporate party in an adversary proceeding (i.e., a bankruptcy court suit) to file a statement identifying the holders of “10% or more” of the party’s equity interests. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7007.1(a). Bankruptcy Judge Martin Glenn, relying on another local Bankruptcy Rule (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. R.

A Chapter 11 debtor “cannot nullify a preexisting obligation in a loan agreement to pay post-default interest solely by proposing a cure,” held a split panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit on Nov. 4, 2016. In re New Investments Inc., 2016 WL 6543520, *3 (9th Cir. Nov. 4, 2016) (2-1).

While a recent federal bankruptcy court ruling provides some clarity as to how midstream gathering agreements may be treated in Chapter 11 cases involving oil and gas exploration and production companies (“E&Ps”), there are still many questions that remain. This Alert analyzes and answers 10 important questions raised by the In re Sabine Oil & Gas Corporation decision of March 8, 2016.[1]

An asset purchaser’s payments into segregated accounts for the benefit of general unsecured creditors and professionals employed by the debtor (i.e., the seller) and its creditors’ committee, made in connection with the purchase of all of the debtor’s assets, are not property of the debtor’s estate or available for distribution to creditors according to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit — even when some of the segregated accounts were listed as consideration in the governing asset purchase agreement. ICL Holding Company, Inc., et al. v.

Bankruptcy courts may hear state law disputes “when the parties knowingly and voluntarily consent,” held the U.S. Supreme Court on May 26, 2015. Wellness Int’l Network Ltd. v. Sharif, 2015 WL 2456619, at *3 (May 26, 2015). That consent, moreover, need not be express, reasoned the Court. Id. at *9 (“Nothing in the Constitution requires that consent to adjudication by a bankruptcy court be express.”). Reversing the U.S.

Following the Dec. 8 publication by the American Bankruptcy Institute (“ABI”) Commission to Study the Reform of Chapter 11 of a report (the “Report”) recommending changes to Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code (“Code”),[1] we continue to analyze the proposals contained in the ABI’s 400-page Report. One proposal we wanted to immediately highlight would, if adopted, significantly increase the risk profile for secured lenders.

This case highlights that the fiduciary duty to avoid conflicts of interest in particular will be strictly adhered to, with questions of fairness or unfairness of the relevant transaction being irrelevant.  Directors are reminded of the need to take great care to manage potential risks when involved in transactions in which they are acting as director of more than one company.  In particular, directors should check the rules in the companies’ constitutions around conflict of interest and if there is any concern, disclose their interest and seek approval of the companie

The Court found that the appointment of voluntary administrators to a company constituted oppressive conduct under section 232 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) in circumstances where it was part of a clear strategy by the controlling shareholder to gain control of the company’s business, to the exclusion of the minority shareholders.  This case provides some useful observations on the operation of section 232, particularly around action by a parent company “of the affairs of” a subsidiary. 

The Court refused to declare an appointment of administrators invalid under section 447C of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) on the basis of a previous purportedly invalid removal of a director and alleged insufficient grounds to establish that the company was, or was likely to become insolvent.  This case illustrates the Court’s willingness to overlook technical anomalies in exercising its discretion under section 447C where the end result for the company would be the same, and a broad approach in assessing whether there are reasonable grounds to form a view that a company