Le 27 juin 2024, la Cour suprême des États-Unis a publié une décision très attendue qu’elle a rendue dans l’affaire William K. Harrington, United States Trustee, Region 2, Petitioner v. Purdue Pharma L.P. et al. (l’« affaire Purdue »).
On June 27, 2024, the Supreme Court of the United States released its highly anticipated decision in William K. Harrington, United States Trustee, Region 2, Petitioner v. Purdue Pharma L.P. et al. (Purdue). At issue was whether the U.S. bankruptcy court had jurisdiction to confirm a plan that provided for releases in favour of non-debtor parties, including parties providing a significant monetary contribution in support of the plan itself.
Dans le contexte en constante évolution des lois canadiennes en matière d’insolvabilité, le regroupement de patrimoines se révèle comme un recours puissant. Bien qu’il soit rarement utilisé, il est susceptible d’entraîner des répercussions importantes pour les entités débitrices visées et leurs créanciers. C’est d’ailleurs ce que souligne une décision récente de la Cour d’appel du Manitoba, laquelle met en avant cet élément complexe, mais crucial, du droit de l’insolvabilité.
REGROUPEMENT DE PATRIMOINES
In the ever-changing landscape of Canadian insolvency law, substantive consolidation emerges as a powerful yet rare remedy with substantial implications for debtor entities and their creditors, as highlighted by a recent decision from the Manitoba Court of Appeal, which sheds light on a complex yet crucial aspect of insolvency law.
SUBSTANTIVE CONSOLIDATION
“[C]ourts may account for hypothetical preference actions within a hypothetical [C]hapter 7 liquidation” to hold a defendant bank (“Bank”) liable for a payment it received within 90 days of a debtor’s bankruptcy, held the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit on March 7, 2017.In re Tenderloin Health, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 4008, *4 (9th Cir. March 7, 2017).
The Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure (“Bankruptcy Rules”) require each corporate party in an adversary proceeding (i.e., a bankruptcy court suit) to file a statement identifying the holders of “10% or more” of the party’s equity interests. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7007.1(a). Bankruptcy Judge Martin Glenn, relying on another local Bankruptcy Rule (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. R.
A Chapter 11 debtor “cannot nullify a preexisting obligation in a loan agreement to pay post-default interest solely by proposing a cure,” held a split panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit on Nov. 4, 2016. In re New Investments Inc., 2016 WL 6543520, *3 (9th Cir. Nov. 4, 2016) (2-1).
While a recent federal bankruptcy court ruling provides some clarity as to how midstream gathering agreements may be treated in Chapter 11 cases involving oil and gas exploration and production companies (“E&Ps”), there are still many questions that remain. This Alert analyzes and answers 10 important questions raised by the In re Sabine Oil & Gas Corporation decision of March 8, 2016.[1]
An asset purchaser’s payments into segregated accounts for the benefit of general unsecured creditors and professionals employed by the debtor (i.e., the seller) and its creditors’ committee, made in connection with the purchase of all of the debtor’s assets, are not property of the debtor’s estate or available for distribution to creditors according to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit — even when some of the segregated accounts were listed as consideration in the governing asset purchase agreement. ICL Holding Company, Inc., et al. v.
Bankruptcy courts may hear state law disputes “when the parties knowingly and voluntarily consent,” held the U.S. Supreme Court on May 26, 2015. Wellness Int’l Network Ltd. v. Sharif, 2015 WL 2456619, at *3 (May 26, 2015). That consent, moreover, need not be express, reasoned the Court. Id. at *9 (“Nothing in the Constitution requires that consent to adjudication by a bankruptcy court be express.”). Reversing the U.S.