The judgment of Chief ICC Judge Briggs in Becker (A Bankrupt) v Ford & Ors [2024] EWHC 1001 (Ch) provides a useful summary of the matters to which the court should have regard when considering an application to lift the suspension of a bankrupt’s discharge.

ICC Judge Mullen’s judgment in Sriram v Revenue & Customs & Anor [2024] EWHC 853 (Ch) follows an application by the bankrupt, Ms Sriram, to annul a bankruptcy order made against her on a petition of HMRC in circumstances in which proper service of both the statutory demand and the petition was contested and in which her capacity to understand the proceedings against her was also in issue.

The recent judgment of HHJ Richard Williams, sitting as a High Court Judge, in Loveridge v Povey & Ors [2024] EWHC 329 (Ch) deals with what he described as a bitter dispute over the Loveridge family business. The business concerned was the operation of caravan parks in Worcestershire, Warwickshire and Shropshire, in part through five companies, and in part through three partnerships at will. The companies made use of interest-free inter-company loans repayable on demand

The case of BTI 2014 LLC v Sequana SA and Ors has had a long and tortuous history, culminating in a Supreme Court decision which has now been handed down over a year after a two day hearing in May last year ([2022] UKSC 25). The bare facts can be simply stated.

“[C]ourts may account for hypothetical preference actions within a hypothetical [C]hapter 7 liquidation” to hold a defendant bank (“Bank”) liable for a payment it received within 90 days of a debtor’s bankruptcy, held the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit on March 7, 2017.In re Tenderloin Health, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 4008, *4 (9th Cir. March 7, 2017).

The Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure (“Bankruptcy Rules”) require each corporate party in an adversary proceeding (i.e., a bankruptcy court suit) to file a statement identifying the holders of “10% or more” of the party’s equity interests. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7007.1(a). Bankruptcy Judge Martin Glenn, relying on another local Bankruptcy Rule (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. R.

A Chapter 11 debtor “cannot nullify a preexisting obligation in a loan agreement to pay post-default interest solely by proposing a cure,” held a split panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit on Nov. 4, 2016. In re New Investments Inc., 2016 WL 6543520, *3 (9th Cir. Nov. 4, 2016) (2-1).

While a recent federal bankruptcy court ruling provides some clarity as to how midstream gathering agreements may be treated in Chapter 11 cases involving oil and gas exploration and production companies (“E&Ps”), there are still many questions that remain. This Alert analyzes and answers 10 important questions raised by the In re Sabine Oil & Gas Corporation decision of March 8, 2016.[1]

An asset purchaser’s payments into segregated accounts for the benefit of general unsecured creditors and professionals employed by the debtor (i.e., the seller) and its creditors’ committee, made in connection with the purchase of all of the debtor’s assets, are not property of the debtor’s estate or available for distribution to creditors according to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit — even when some of the segregated accounts were listed as consideration in the governing asset purchase agreement. ICL Holding Company, Inc., et al. v.

Bankruptcy courts may hear state law disputes “when the parties knowingly and voluntarily consent,” held the U.S. Supreme Court on May 26, 2015. Wellness Int’l Network Ltd. v. Sharif, 2015 WL 2456619, at *3 (May 26, 2015). That consent, moreover, need not be express, reasoned the Court. Id. at *9 (“Nothing in the Constitution requires that consent to adjudication by a bankruptcy court be express.”). Reversing the U.S.