In a challenging economic climate, we usually see an increase in leases ending prematurely, either by agreement or by landlords irritating (forfeiting) the lease when they are faced with an insolvent tenant or bad payers. Tenants in these circumstances will often leave behind goods and equipment. The temptation for landlords is just to throw the stuff away so they can re-let but there are restrictions on what a landlord can and can't do with abandoned goods in Scotland.

What should you do if a tenant leaves goods behind at the premises (tenant not insolvent)?

'Chapter 11 bankruptcy', the US insolvency regime, often features in the UK headlines. When Lehman Brothers filed under Chapter 11 in 2008, it marked the start of the global financial crisis. Chapter 11 (which refers to part of the US Bankruptcy Code) is a restructuring tool designed to rescue companies. Its closest UK counterpart is Administration, under Schedule B1 to the Insolvency Act 1986.

In previous blogs, we’ve discussed the temporary changes to the law being brought about by the UK Government’s Corporate Insolvency and Governance Bill. The Bill is set to strip Landlords of some of the tools available to recover arrears from their tenants. It will render statutory demands served between 1 March to 30 June 2020 ineffective, while making it near impossible for landlords to liquidate tenants (by winding them up) if they have been financially affected by COVID-19.

In previous blogs, we’ve discussed the temporary changes to the law being brought about by the UK Government’s Corporate Insolvency and Governance Bill. The Bill is set to strip Landlords of some of the tools available to recover arrears from their tenants. It will render statutory demands served between 1 March to 30 June 2020 ineffective, while making it near impossible for landlords to liquidate tenants (by winding them up) if they have been financially affected by COVID-19.

“[C]ourts may account for hypothetical preference actions within a hypothetical [C]hapter 7 liquidation” to hold a defendant bank (“Bank”) liable for a payment it received within 90 days of a debtor’s bankruptcy, held the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit on March 7, 2017.In re Tenderloin Health, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 4008, *4 (9th Cir. March 7, 2017).

The Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure (“Bankruptcy Rules”) require each corporate party in an adversary proceeding (i.e., a bankruptcy court suit) to file a statement identifying the holders of “10% or more” of the party’s equity interests. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7007.1(a). Bankruptcy Judge Martin Glenn, relying on another local Bankruptcy Rule (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. R.

A Chapter 11 debtor “cannot nullify a preexisting obligation in a loan agreement to pay post-default interest solely by proposing a cure,” held a split panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit on Nov. 4, 2016. In re New Investments Inc., 2016 WL 6543520, *3 (9th Cir. Nov. 4, 2016) (2-1).

While a recent federal bankruptcy court ruling provides some clarity as to how midstream gathering agreements may be treated in Chapter 11 cases involving oil and gas exploration and production companies (“E&Ps”), there are still many questions that remain. This Alert analyzes and answers 10 important questions raised by the In re Sabine Oil & Gas Corporation decision of March 8, 2016.[1]

An asset purchaser’s payments into segregated accounts for the benefit of general unsecured creditors and professionals employed by the debtor (i.e., the seller) and its creditors’ committee, made in connection with the purchase of all of the debtor’s assets, are not property of the debtor’s estate or available for distribution to creditors according to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit — even when some of the segregated accounts were listed as consideration in the governing asset purchase agreement. ICL Holding Company, Inc., et al. v.

Bankruptcy courts may hear state law disputes “when the parties knowingly and voluntarily consent,” held the U.S. Supreme Court on May 26, 2015. Wellness Int’l Network Ltd. v. Sharif, 2015 WL 2456619, at *3 (May 26, 2015). That consent, moreover, need not be express, reasoned the Court. Id. at *9 (“Nothing in the Constitution requires that consent to adjudication by a bankruptcy court be express.”). Reversing the U.S.