The Law to mitigate the consequences of the COVID 19 pandemic in civil, insolvency and criminal procedure law ("Gesetz zur Abmilderung der Folgen der COVID-19-Pandemie im Zivil-, Insolvenz- und Strafverfahrensrecht") was adopted by the German Bundestag on 25 March and approved by the Bundesrat representing the federal states on 27 March 2020. With its draft published by the German Federal government on 23 March 2020, the implementation was probably the fastest legislative procedure of such scope in the history of the Federal Republic.

In the light of immense pressure on the liquidity of many companies and obligations to file for insolvency in case of illiquidity or overindebtedness, the Germany government will suspend this obligation until 30 September 2020. The suspension will apply if the insolvency is caused by the coronavirus pandemic and if there are sufficient prospects that the company can be turned around.

Das Oberlandesgericht München hat in einem bisher unveröffentlichten Hinweisbeschluss^[1] die Rechtsauffassung des Oberlandesgerichts Celle^[2] und des Oberlandesgerichts Düsseldorfs^[3] bestätigt, dass für Ansprüche des Insolvenzverwalters gegen Geschäftsführer wegen Zahlungen trotz Insolvenzreife kein Versicherungsschutz unter einer D&O-Versicherung besteht. Daneben hat das Oberlandesgericht München auch zur Verteilung der Darlegungs- und Beweislast in Abtretungskonstellationen Stellung bezogen.

Reform des Insolvenzanfechtungsrechts

Das Gesetz zur Reform des Insolvenzanfechtungsrechts ist am 05.04.2017 in Kraft getreten. Im Fokus steht mit § 133 InsO die sogenannte Voranfechtung, die bislang in ihrer Ausprägung durch die Rechtsprechung des Bundesgerichtshofs in der Kritik stand. Im Ergebnis musste ein Gläubiger so bereits dann mit einer Insolvenzanfechtung durch den Insolvenzverwalter rechnen, wenn er seinem Schuldner eine Ratenzahlung gewährte.

“[C]ourts may account for hypothetical preference actions within a hypothetical [C]hapter 7 liquidation” to hold a defendant bank (“Bank”) liable for a payment it received within 90 days of a debtor’s bankruptcy, held the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit on March 7, 2017.In re Tenderloin Health, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 4008, *4 (9th Cir. March 7, 2017).

The Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure (“Bankruptcy Rules”) require each corporate party in an adversary proceeding (i.e., a bankruptcy court suit) to file a statement identifying the holders of “10% or more” of the party’s equity interests. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7007.1(a). Bankruptcy Judge Martin Glenn, relying on another local Bankruptcy Rule (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. R.

A Chapter 11 debtor “cannot nullify a preexisting obligation in a loan agreement to pay post-default interest solely by proposing a cure,” held a split panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit on Nov. 4, 2016. In re New Investments Inc., 2016 WL 6543520, *3 (9th Cir. Nov. 4, 2016) (2-1).

While a recent federal bankruptcy court ruling provides some clarity as to how midstream gathering agreements may be treated in Chapter 11 cases involving oil and gas exploration and production companies (“E&Ps”), there are still many questions that remain. This Alert analyzes and answers 10 important questions raised by the In re Sabine Oil & Gas Corporation decision of March 8, 2016.[1]

An asset purchaser’s payments into segregated accounts for the benefit of general unsecured creditors and professionals employed by the debtor (i.e., the seller) and its creditors’ committee, made in connection with the purchase of all of the debtor’s assets, are not property of the debtor’s estate or available for distribution to creditors according to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit — even when some of the segregated accounts were listed as consideration in the governing asset purchase agreement. ICL Holding Company, Inc., et al. v.

Bankruptcy courts may hear state law disputes “when the parties knowingly and voluntarily consent,” held the U.S. Supreme Court on May 26, 2015. Wellness Int’l Network Ltd. v. Sharif, 2015 WL 2456619, at *3 (May 26, 2015). That consent, moreover, need not be express, reasoned the Court. Id. at *9 (“Nothing in the Constitution requires that consent to adjudication by a bankruptcy court be express.”). Reversing the U.S.