Now that their bankruptcy filing is a few weeks behind us, we provide below an update on certain matters of interest in the case of Celsius Networks and its affiliates. Of course, it’s still very early in the bankruptcy case — and in cryptocurrency cases in general — but we have already heard from many distressed opportunity investors that are interested in identifying investment opportunities. Given the novel legal and difficult valuation issues involved, it will be important to keep a close eye on the developments in these proceedings.

The first week of July has brought with it a flurry of activity in the digital asset markets – but not the type of activity that investors in the space likely hoped for.

Celsius Networks (“Celsius”) became the latest cryptocurrency platform to raise market temperatures by halting all withdrawals, swaps and transfers from and between its customers’ accounts on June 12, 2022. Celsius touted a next wave of “unbanking,” operating a lending platform allowing the holders of digital assets the opportunity to earn a significantly high returns on those assets.

Given the recent media coverage and growing concerns among investors over the risks associated with a bankruptcy filing of a cryptocurrency exchange, it feels timely to highlight some issues that arose in the Chapter 11 cases of Cred Inc. and certain of its affiliates (collectively, “Cred”).

Considerations of “environmental, social and governance” (or ESG) criteria with respect to a company’s management and operations continue to take on greater importance in lenders’ and investors’ credit and investment decisions. How a borrower or a target company measures up to these ever-developing ESG standards will impact its cost of capital and value to potential investors and acquirors.

This past year was marked by extraordinary deal activity. Record breaking M&A activity drove record breaking private credit activity. Private equity M&A activity was at a substantial high, with over 8,500 deals worth $2.1 trillion, a 60% increase over 2020. Not surprisingly, in this environment, defaults were at all-time lows. The Proskauer Private Credit Default tracker showed an active default rate of approximately 1% at the end of 2021, compared to 3.6% in 2020.

Despite the Supreme Court’s rejection of a structured dismissal in 2017,[1] there is a growing trend of bankruptcy courts approving structured dismissals of chapter 11 cases following a successful sale of a debtor’s assets under Section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code.

The primary investment thesis of a private credit lender is simple — get the loan repaid at maturity. Private credit lenders do not make loans as a means to acquire their borrower’s business. There are circumstances, however, where private credit lenders must be prepared to take ownership when the borrower is distressed and there is no realistic prospect of near-term loan repayment. Becoming the owner of a borrower’s business may very well be the loan recovery option of last resort.

Our private credit clients are preparing for the next restructuring cycle and have called us about ultrafast bankruptcy cases. These chapter 11 cases have grabbed headlines because they lasted less than a day. Specifically, FullBeauty Brands and Sungard Availability Services emerged from bankruptcy in 24 hours and 19 hours, respectively. Is this a trend and which companies are best suited to zip through chapter 11?

A. Prepacks, Pre-Negotiated Cases, and Free-Falls

The securities safe harbor protection of Bankruptcy Code (“Code”) § 546(e) does not protect allegedly fraudulent “transfers in which financial institutions served as mere conduits,” held the U.S. Supreme Court on Feb. 27, 2018. Merit Management Group LP v. FTI Consulting Inc., 2018 WL 1054879, *7 (2018). Affirming the Seventh Circuit’s reinstatement of the bankruptcy trustee’s complaint alleging the insolvent debtor’s overpayment for a stock interest, the Court found the payment not covered by §546(e) and thus recoverable. The district court had dismissed the trustee’s claim.