Once again, we reflect on the prior year for restructuring trends impacting private credit lenders. Last year it was all about “liability management”—the latest trend in which the limits of sponsor-favorable loan documents are being tested, in some cases past the breaking point.

A common yet contentious liability management strategy is an “uptier” transaction, where lenders holding a majority of loans or notes under a financing agreement seek to elevate or “roll-up” the priority of their debt above the previously pari passu debt held by the non-participating minority lenders. In a recent decision in the Boardriders case, the minority lenders defeated a motion to dismiss various claims challenging an uptier transaction.

In an important decision to private credit lenders, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that a make-whole premium for an unsecured creditor tied to future interest payments is the “functional equivalent of unmatured interest” and not recoverable under Section 502(b)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code. Ultra Petroleum Corp. v. Ad Hoc Committee of OpCo Unsecured Creditors (In re Ultra Petroleum Corp.), No. 21-20008 (5th Cir. Oct. 14, 2022) (“Ultra”). Ordinarily, the story ends here.

Creditors of distressed businesses are often frustrated by shareholder-controlled boards when directors pursue strategies that appear to be designed to benefit shareholders at the creditors’ expense. In these circumstances, creditors might consider sending a letter to the board to convince the directors to pivot and adopt alternative strategies or face risk of liability for breaching fiduciary duties. The efficacy of this approach depends on many factors, including the company’s financial condition, the board’s composition and the underlying transactions at issue.

This past year was marked by extraordinary deal activity. Record breaking M&A activity drove record breaking private credit activity. Private equity M&A activity was at a substantial high, with over 8,500 deals worth $2.1 trillion, a 60% increase over 2020. Not surprisingly, in this environment, defaults were at all-time lows. The Proskauer Private Credit Default tracker showed an active default rate of approximately 1% at the end of 2021, compared to 3.6% in 2020.

Despite the Supreme Court’s rejection of a structured dismissal in 2017,[1] there is a growing trend of bankruptcy courts approving structured dismissals of chapter 11 cases following a successful sale of a debtor’s assets under Section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code.

The primary investment thesis of a private credit lender is simple — get the loan repaid at maturity. Private credit lenders do not make loans as a means to acquire their borrower’s business. There are circumstances, however, where private credit lenders must be prepared to take ownership when the borrower is distressed and there is no realistic prospect of near-term loan repayment. Becoming the owner of a borrower’s business may very well be the loan recovery option of last resort.

Our private credit clients are preparing for the next restructuring cycle and have called us about ultrafast bankruptcy cases. These chapter 11 cases have grabbed headlines because they lasted less than a day. Specifically, FullBeauty Brands and Sungard Availability Services emerged from bankruptcy in 24 hours and 19 hours, respectively. Is this a trend and which companies are best suited to zip through chapter 11?

A. Prepacks, Pre-Negotiated Cases, and Free-Falls

近年来，我国宏观经济增长放缓，国家调整产业和信贷政策，并逐渐加强金融监管，商业银行的资产质量压力有所增加，十亿甚至百亿级别的债务逾期或潜在违约浮出水面。这些巨无霸级别的潜在不良贷款风险，迫切要求商业银行审查并改善贷前贷后管理中的遗漏和问题，也对商业银行的危机处理能力提出了更高的挑战。

大敌当前，痛定思痛，当危机来临时，商业银行的管理层和执行层需要的是冷静的思考、周密的策划，以及必要时刻壮士断腕的决策力。从本团队近期参与处理的几项复杂的债务逾期及潜在违约案例来看，危机的表象多种多样，除了资金周转困难带来直接的偿付危机；有的则是债务人控制人挪用公司资金投入股市炒股，有的是公司实际控制人陷入刑事调查和指控，也有的则更为隐蔽，债务人关联主体在境外受到他国政府的调查等等。这些危机虽然不一定直接表现为到期不付，但可能已经导致债务人违反融资文件的陈述、承诺条款，甚至通过交叉违约触发了违约事件或潜在违约事件。

本文旨在梳理危机处理的思路，通盘策划全面追索资产的策略，为贷款管理工作层面制定一份简介易行的“工作方案”，以便为后续的债务重组和清偿争取宝贵的时间，避免弯路：

一、梳理融资文件

As the Chinese economy enters the “new normal”, the Chinese government has been adjusting its industrial and credit-related policies and strengthening regulation of Chinese financial institutions. A large number of non-performing loans (NPLs) as well as actual loan defaults have started to surface. The risks associated with rising levels of NPLs require Chinese banks to enhance their ex ante and ex post credit risk management practices.