The appointment of an independent director is a powerful tool for private credit lenders. The appointment is designed to introduce a voice of neutrality and fairness into the board’s decision-making process with the hope and expectation that independence from the controlling shareholder enables the board to drive toward viable value-maximizing strategies. Often times, the independent director is vested with exclusive authority (or veto rights) over a range of significant corporate decisions, including a sale, restructuring and the decision to file a bankruptcy case.

One common denominator links nearly all stressed businesses: tight liquidity. After the liquidity hole is identified and sized, the discussion inevitably turns to the question of who will fund the necessary capital to extend the liquidity runway. For a PE-backed business where there is a credible path to recovery, a sponsor, due to its existing equity stake, is often willing to inject additional capital into an underperforming portfolio company.

In a much-anticipated decision, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit recently held that unsecured noteholders’ claims against a debtor for certain “Applicable Premiums” were the “economic equivalent” to unmatured interest and, therefore, not recoverable under section 502(b)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code.

The German Federal Court of Justice (the Federal Court) has considered whether a so-called "weak" preliminary insolvency administrator, entrusted to continue business operations with the management during the preliminary proceeding, may take actions in the interest of these operations, where it is unclear whether the debtor has discontinued the business.

Background

According to the German Federal Court of Justice (the Court), a “related party” (nahestehende Person) within the meaning of German insolvency law includes in the case of a legal entity, an indirect shareholder, provided that it holds more than 25% of the shares. Here, the Court will assume that the legal entity has advance knowledge of the financial situation of its subsidiary.

Background

As you know from our prior alerts, creditors of borrowers formed as Delaware LLCs (as opposed to corporations) lack standing under Delaware law to sue directors for breaching fiduciary duties even when, to the surprise of many, the LLC is insolvent. See our prior Alert. The disparity of substantive creditor rights depending entirely on corporate form results from two aspects of Delaware law.

There is a growing trend of bankruptcy courts approving structured dismissals of chapter 11 cases following a successful sale of a debtor’s assets under section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code. A structured dismissal is a cost‑effective way for a debtor to exit chapter 11 and is an alternative to (a) confirming a post‑sale liquidating plan, which is expensive and not always viable, or (b) converting the case to chapter 7, which introduces significant uncertainty and unpredictability with the appointment of a chapter 7 trustee to replace management.

In a recent case before the Federal Court of Justice, an insolvency administrator was found to have neglected his duties of investigation in a particularly serious and reproachable manner.

Decision

The insolvency administrator had contested the offsetting of an investment subsidy by the creditor bank to balance the debtor’s accounts.

The focus of the decision was whether the insolvency administrator had made the contestation claim within the statutory limitation period. In Germany, this is usually three years and starts:

Bankruptcy Considerations for Unitranche Transactions with Super-Priority Revolvers without an AAL

Recently, two significant distressed companies with thousands of commercial leases, Rite Aid and WeWork, each filed chapter 11 bankruptcy cases, seeking in part to rationalize their geographic footprints through the rejection of a substantial portion of their lease portfolios.