The appointment of an independent director is a powerful tool for private credit lenders. The appointment is designed to introduce a voice of neutrality and fairness into the board’s decision-making process with the hope and expectation that independence from the controlling shareholder enables the board to drive toward viable value-maximizing strategies. Often times, the independent director is vested with exclusive authority (or veto rights) over a range of significant corporate decisions, including a sale, restructuring and the decision to file a bankruptcy case.

One common denominator links nearly all stressed businesses: tight liquidity. After the liquidity hole is identified and sized, the discussion inevitably turns to the question of who will fund the necessary capital to extend the liquidity runway. For a PE-backed business where there is a credible path to recovery, a sponsor, due to its existing equity stake, is often willing to inject additional capital into an underperforming portfolio company.

In a much-anticipated decision, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit recently held that unsecured noteholders’ claims against a debtor for certain “Applicable Premiums” were the “economic equivalent” to unmatured interest and, therefore, not recoverable under section 502(b)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code.

As you know from our prior alerts, creditors of borrowers formed as Delaware LLCs (as opposed to corporations) lack standing under Delaware law to sue directors for breaching fiduciary duties even when, to the surprise of many, the LLC is insolvent. See our prior Alert. The disparity of substantive creditor rights depending entirely on corporate form results from two aspects of Delaware law.

There is a growing trend of bankruptcy courts approving structured dismissals of chapter 11 cases following a successful sale of a debtor’s assets under section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code. A structured dismissal is a cost‑effective way for a debtor to exit chapter 11 and is an alternative to (a) confirming a post‑sale liquidating plan, which is expensive and not always viable, or (b) converting the case to chapter 7, which introduces significant uncertainty and unpredictability with the appointment of a chapter 7 trustee to replace management.

此前我们在《从“License-in”转型“License-out”——你的“自主知识产权”成色几何？》中对企业在开展License-out过程中涉及的知识产权侵权问题进行了梳理，并提出了实操建议供企业参考。此外，在技术许可交易中，还有一个此前常被中国企业在技术交易中忽略的问题，即技术许可方破产对技术许可的影响。随着中国技术类企业正逐步从技术引进（“License-in”）转向技术输出（“License-out”），中国企业也时常碰到境外被许可方提出的“破产保护”诉求。我们将在本文中对该问题进行探讨，并对国外常见的应对方案“技术托管”进行较为详细的介绍。

一、许可方破产对技术许可合同的影响

Bankruptcy Considerations for Unitranche Transactions with Super-Priority Revolvers without an AAL

Recently, two significant distressed companies with thousands of commercial leases, Rite Aid and WeWork, each filed chapter 11 bankruptcy cases, seeking in part to rationalize their geographic footprints through the rejection of a substantial portion of their lease portfolios.

In our prior alert over the summer, we highlighted the Delaware Supreme Court’s decision in Stream TV Networks, Inc. v. SeeCubic, Inc., 279 A.3d 323, 329 (Del.

Restructurings defy a one-size fits all approach because every deal is unique and different tools are required to solve different problems. At one end of the restructuring continuum is the so-called “amend and extend,” where the credit agreement is amended to provide incremental liquidity, extend near-term maturities, modify covenants or some combination of the foregoing. This approach is fast and cost-efficient, but limited in its impact. At the other end of the spectrum is a restructuring through chapter 11.