The appointment of an independent director is a powerful tool for private credit lenders. The appointment is designed to introduce a voice of neutrality and fairness into the board’s decision-making process with the hope and expectation that independence from the controlling shareholder enables the board to drive toward viable value-maximizing strategies. Often times, the independent director is vested with exclusive authority (or veto rights) over a range of significant corporate decisions, including a sale, restructuring and the decision to file a bankruptcy case.

One common denominator links nearly all stressed businesses: tight liquidity. After the liquidity hole is identified and sized, the discussion inevitably turns to the question of who will fund the necessary capital to extend the liquidity runway. For a PE-backed business where there is a credible path to recovery, a sponsor, due to its existing equity stake, is often willing to inject additional capital into an underperforming portfolio company.

In a much-anticipated decision, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit recently held that unsecured noteholders’ claims against a debtor for certain “Applicable Premiums” were the “economic equivalent” to unmatured interest and, therefore, not recoverable under section 502(b)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code.

Since the inception of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 in December 2016, India has witnessed not only a paradigm shift from the conventional ‘debtor in possession’ to a progressive ‘creditor in control’ but has also produced desirable results under the new statutory debt resolution regime.

The IBBI Working Group on Group Insolvency (under the chairmanship of UK Sinha) and the MCA Cross Border Insolvency Rules/Regulations Committee having submitted their reports (collectively “Reports”) had recommended the introduction of a framework governing the resolution of enterprise groups under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (“IBC”) in September 2019 and December 2021 respectively.

Since the inception of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (“Code“), the debt resolution regime in India has witnessed not only a paradigm shift from the conventional ‘debtor in possession’ to a progressive ‘creditor in control’ but has also undergone a significant transformation, marking a departure from its traditional labyrinthine processes to a more streamlined and effective framework.

The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (IBC) has been at loggerheads with the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (PMLA) on various occasions in the corporate insolvency resolution process (CIRP) of a distressed entity. Courts and tribunals have passed varying judgments, either giving primacy to the IBC or allowing the Enforcement Directorate (ED), a functionary under the PMLA, to perform its duties irrespective of the ongoing CIRP of a company.

As you know from our prior alerts, creditors of borrowers formed as Delaware LLCs (as opposed to corporations) lack standing under Delaware law to sue directors for breaching fiduciary duties even when, to the surprise of many, the LLC is insolvent. See our prior Alert. The disparity of substantive creditor rights depending entirely on corporate form results from two aspects of Delaware law.

There is a growing trend of bankruptcy courts approving structured dismissals of chapter 11 cases following a successful sale of a debtor’s assets under section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code. A structured dismissal is a cost‑effective way for a debtor to exit chapter 11 and is an alternative to (a) confirming a post‑sale liquidating plan, which is expensive and not always viable, or (b) converting the case to chapter 7, which introduces significant uncertainty and unpredictability with the appointment of a chapter 7 trustee to replace management.

Bankruptcy Considerations for Unitranche Transactions with Super-Priority Revolvers without an AAL