The High Court of Hong Kong refused to allow a Chapter 11 Trustee to disclose a Decision from Hong Kong winding up proceedings in the US bankruptcy court. The US proceedings were commenced to prevent a creditor from taking action following a breach of undertakings given to the Hong Kong court in circumstances where the company had no jurisdictional connection with the US.

The Bankruptcy Code (“Code”) permits “a creditor [to] assert an unsecured claim for post-[bankruptcy] attorneys’ fees based on a pre-[bankruptcy] promissory note,” held the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit on Feb. 8, 2019. SummitBridge Nat’l Investments III, LLC v. Faison, 2019 WL 490573, *2 (4th Cir. Feb. 8, 2019). In a sensible opinion, the Fourth Circuit reversed the lower courts’ disallowance of an undersecured lender’s claim for legal fees. The court thus “join[ed] other federal courts of appeals” with its holding. Id.

Following our previous article, the Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal following the High Court deciding that a moratorium in relation to restructuring proceedings in Azerbaijan could not be extended in breach of the Gibbs rule, allowing two significant creditors to proceed with their claims in the English Courts.

“A … transferee [who] received fraudulent transfers with actual knowledge or inquiry notice of fraud or insolvency” loses any “good faith” defense available under the Texas version of the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (“TUFTA”), held the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit on Jan. 9, 2019. Janvey v. GMAG LLC, 2019 WL 141107, *3 (5th Cir. Jan. 9, 2019) (emphasis added).

Despite the debtor's contention that his primary residence was in the United States, the Court held that it had jurisdiction to make a Bankruptcy Order following a petition presented by HMRC.

HMRC presented a bankruptcy petition against Robert Stayton on 30 May 2014 who owed approximately £653,640. The matter came before the court on a number of occasions before the final hearing, with judgment being handed down in November 2018.

“Section 365(h) of the Bankruptcy Code [(“Code”)] and the doctrine of equitable recoupment entitled [a commercial tenant] to continue paying [reduced] rent … even after its landlord filed for bankruptcy and rejected the Lease,” held the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit on Nov. 30, 2018. In re Revel AC Inc., 2018 WL 6259316, *6 (3d Cir. Nov. 30, 2018).

Two courts have added to the murky case law addressing a bankruptcy trustee’s ability to recover a debtor’s tuition payments for their children. In Geltzer v. Oberlin College, et al., 2018 WL 6333588 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Dec. 4, 2018), a New York Bankruptcy Judge permitted a trustee to claw back payments that parents made to their financially independent adult children for college-related costs. In Pergament v. Brooklyn Law School, et al., 2018 WL 6182502 (E.D.N.Y. Nov.

The Bankruptcy Code (“Code”) “does not limit the allowability of unsecured claims for contractual post-[bankruptcy] attorneys’ fees,” held the U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware on Nov. 26, 2018. In re Tribune Media Company, 2018 WL 6167504 (D. Del. Nov. 26, 2018). In a short and sensible opinion, the district court reversed the bankruptcy court’s disallowance of an undersecured lender’s fees.

“… Ponzi scheme payments to satisfy legitimate antecedent debts to defendant banks could not be avoided” by a bankruptcy trustee “absent transaction-specific proof of actual intent to defraud or the statutory elements of constructive fraud – transfer by an insolvent debtor who did not receive reasonably equivalent value in exchange,” held the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit on Nov. 20, 2018. Stoebner v. Opportunity Finance LLC, 2018 WL 6055636 at *4 (8th Cir. Nov. 20, 2018), citing Finn v. Alliance Bank, 860 N.W. 2d 638, 653-56 (Minn. 2015).

A discharged Bankrupt had intentionally misled the Court as to his COMI being in England and Wales in order to obtain a Bankruptcy Order. Four years after the making of the Bankruptcy Order, the Court annulled it on the grounds that the Court did not have jurisdiction to make the Order in the first place.