Two recent Supreme Court of Canada decisions demonstrate that the corporate attribution doctrine is not a one-size-fits-all approach.
Le 27 juin 2024, la Cour suprême des États-Unis a publié une décision très attendue qu’elle a rendue dans l’affaire William K. Harrington, United States Trustee, Region 2, Petitioner v. Purdue Pharma L.P. et al. (l’« affaire Purdue »).
On June 27, 2024, the Supreme Court of the United States released its highly anticipated decision in William K. Harrington, United States Trustee, Region 2, Petitioner v. Purdue Pharma L.P. et al. (Purdue). At issue was whether the U.S. bankruptcy court had jurisdiction to confirm a plan that provided for releases in favour of non-debtor parties, including parties providing a significant monetary contribution in support of the plan itself.
Dans le contexte en constante évolution des lois canadiennes en matière d’insolvabilité, le regroupement de patrimoines se révèle comme un recours puissant. Bien qu’il soit rarement utilisé, il est susceptible d’entraîner des répercussions importantes pour les entités débitrices visées et leurs créanciers. C’est d’ailleurs ce que souligne une décision récente de la Cour d’appel du Manitoba, laquelle met en avant cet élément complexe, mais crucial, du droit de l’insolvabilité.
REGROUPEMENT DE PATRIMOINES
In the ever-changing landscape of Canadian insolvency law, substantive consolidation emerges as a powerful yet rare remedy with substantial implications for debtor entities and their creditors, as highlighted by a recent decision from the Manitoba Court of Appeal, which sheds light on a complex yet crucial aspect of insolvency law.
SUBSTANTIVE CONSOLIDATION
Court approval of a sale process in receivership or Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (“BIA”) proposal proceedings is generally a procedural order and objectors do not have an appeal as of right; they must seek leave and meet a high test in order obtain it. However, in Peakhill Capital Inc. v.
The Eighth Circuit held that “avoidance actions [e.g., preferences, fraudulent transfers] can be sold as property of the [Chapter 7 debtor’s] estate.” In re Simply Essentials, LLC, 2023 WL 5341506, *1 (8th Cir. Aug. 21, 2023). On a direct appeal from the bankruptcy court, the court affirmed the bankruptcy court’s granting of the trustee’s motions to compromise and sell property under Bankruptcy Code §363(f). A creditor had objected, arguing unsuccessfully that “avoidance actions… are not part of the bankruptcy estate ….” Id.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit quietly affirmed a bankruptcy court’s dismissal of an involuntary petition because the petitioners’ “claims were the subject of bona fide disputes within the meaning of” Bankruptcy Code (Code) §303(b)(1) (petitioner may not hold claim that is “the subject of a bona fide dispute as to liability or amount”). In re Navient Solutions, LLC, 2023 WL 3487051 (2d Cir. May 17, 2023).
On May 30, 2023, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed a bankruptcy court’s confirmation of a chapter 11 reorganization plan containing nonconsensual releases of direct claims against third-party non-debtors, including the debtor’s controlling owners, the Sacklers.
Is an insolvent debtor’s pre-bankruptcy termination of a commercial lease a fraudulent transfer? The Third Circuit said no when it held that a lessor’s pre-bankruptcy termination of the debtors’ lease and purchase option “was not a transfer under Bankruptcy Code §548(a) (1)(B).” In re Pazzo Pazzo Inc., 2022 WL 17690158 (3d Cir. Dec. 15, 2022). But the Seventh Circuit held that a chapter 11 debtor’s pre-bankruptcy “surrender of [two] … leases to [its landlord] could be regarded as a preferential [or fraudulent] transfer.” In re Great Lakes Quick Lube L.P., 816 F.3d 482 (7th Cir. 2016).