In its recently issued decision in Husky International Electronics, Inc. v. Ritz, a 7-1 majority of the Supreme Court has clarified that intentionally fraudulent transfers designed to hinder or defraud creditors can fall within the definition of “actual fraud” under Section 523(a)(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code and can sometimes result in corresponding liabilities being non-dischargeable in a personal bankruptcy proceeding.1
From May 11 to May 13, 2016, SRC Liquidation, LLC International Holdings, LLC (“Liquidating Debtor”), unleashed yet another wave of preference actions, filing approximately 257 additional complaints seeking the avoidance and recovery of allegedly preferential and fraudulent transfers under Sections 547 and 550 of the Bankruptcy Code. The Liquidating Debtor also seeks to disallow claims of such preference defendants under Sections 502(d) and (j) of the Bankruptcy Code.
On May 5, 2016, SRC Liquidation, LLC International Holdings, LLC (“Liquidating Debtor”), filed approximately 137 complaints seeking the avoidance and recovery of allegedly preferential and fraudulent transfers under Sections 547 and 550 of the Bankruptcy Code. The Liquidating Debtor also seeks to disallow claims of such preference defendants under Sections 502(d) and (j) of the Bankruptcy Code.
On May 1, 2016, BIND Therapeutics, Inc., and affiliated companies (“Debtors” or “BIND”) voluntarily filed for bankruptcy protection under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code.
The filing comes days after the Cambridge, Mass., company received a notice of default from lender Hercules Technology III LP, which demanded immediate payment of the $14.5 million the lender says it is owed under the loan. The Company is backed by Koch Industry Inc.’s David Koch.
In a March 29, 2016 decision,1 the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit (the "Court of Appeals") held that creditors are preempted from asserting state law constructive fraudulent conveyance claims by virtue of the Bankruptcy Code's "safe harbors" that, among other things, exempt transfers made in connection with a contract for the purchase, sale or loan of a security (here, in the context of a leveraged buyout ("LBO")), from being clawed back into the bankruptcy estate for distribution to creditors.
Recently in the Abengoa SA bankruptcy proceeding (click here to review prior post), the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware entered an order permitting Debtors to reject certain nonresidential real property leases (the “Rejection Order”).
On January 4, 2016, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York (the “Bankruptcy Court”) deviated from SDNY precedent and held that, despite the absence of clear Congressional intent, the avoidance powers provided for under Section 548 of the Bankruptcy Code can be applied extraterritorially. As a result, a fraudulent transfer of property of a debtor’s estate that occurs outside of the United States can be recovered under Section 550 of the Bankruptcy Code.
On December 14, 2015, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that claims arising from securities of a debtor’s affiliate must be subordinated to all claims or interests senior or equal to claims of the same type as the underlying securities in the bankruptcy proceeding.
Dealing a major blow to the trustee’s efforts to recover fraudulent transfers on behalf of the bankruptcy estate of the company run by Bernard Madoff, Judge Jed S. Rakoff of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York held in SIPC v. Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC1 that the Bankruptcy Code cannot be used to recover fraudulent transfers of funds that occur entirely outside the United States.
In the case of Coughlin v. South Canaan Cellular Investments, LLC, C.A. No. 7202-VCL (Del. Ch. July 6, 2012), Respondents made a request for fee shifting under the bad-faith exception to the American Rule. In reviewing this fee shifting request, the Court found that Respondents’ request itself was unfounded, and coupled with Respondents’ own conduct in the case, instead awarded Petitioner his fees in costs in the amount of $17,906.