在经济下行的时候，原来一些质地不错的企业也会陷入困境。对于困境企业而言，通过破产重整焕发生机，也许是最后一根救命稻草；对于投资人而言，未来真正的赚钱机会，也将出现在更多、更复杂的破产重整项目中。今天，我想跟大家谈谈破产重整投资的趋势、挑战与未来。

一、重整投资的趋势

首先，我们来谈谈重整投资已经展现出的四个变化趋势。

第一个趋势，是从被动投资到主动投资。

什么是被动投资？以往一些破产项目中的重整投资人，往往本身就是破产企业的债权人，他们随着陷入危机的破产企业一起被困在了“水中”，不得不通过参与重整投资寻求最后的“上岸”机会，比较典型的就是一些作为困境企业债权人的AMC公司。

什么是主动投资？这几年里，逐渐有一些“岸上的人”也瞄准了重整投资领域。“岸上的人”，是与困境企业没有关系的外部投资人，他们没有受到困境企业的牵连，而是将重整投资视作一个宝贵的商业机会，主动参与其中。这样的“岸上投资人”，既包括产业投资人，也包括财务投资人。

1. 最实在的权利 清算优先权，或优先清算权(Liquidation Preference)，是指“清算事件”发生时，投资人在清算财产分配过程中享有优先顺位的权利。通常，越晚进来的投资人清算优先的顺位越高，但在老投资人强势时也可能会约定新老投资人之间平等顺位，按投资金额比例甚至股权比例分优先金额。相比实际上基本用不上的分红优先权，清算优先权是更实用、也更可能给投资人创造实际价值的经济权利。

2. 好坏通吃 清算优先权可以在公司情况不佳(downside)时让投资人优先拿回一点补偿，也可以在公司获得好的收购机会(upside)时使得投资人获利更多。

3. 只是清算？ 如果“清算事件”仅包括法律意义上的清算(例如公司解散或破产时的清算)，那实际用途不大，关键是它还包括“视同清算事件”。“视同清算事件”的情形通常包括导致控制权变更的合并、收购，以及出售、租赁、转让、以排他性许可或其他方式处置公司全部或大部分资产的事件。考虑到解散或破产清算时公司多半已经没有太多资产可分，发生并购事件才是清算优先权最大的用武之地。

On July 6-7, 2017, Craig Jalbert, in his capacity as Trustee for F2 Liquidating Trust, filed approximately 187 complaints seeking the avoidance and recovery of allegedly preferential and/or fraudulent transfers under Sections 547, 548 and 550 of the Bankruptcy Code (depending on the nature of the claims). In certain instances, the Trustee also seeks to disallow claims of such defendants under Sections 502(d) and (j) of the Bankruptcy Code.

On June 15, 2017, Curtis R. Smith, as Liquidating Trustee of the Hastings Creditors’ Liquidating Trust, filed approximately 69 complaints seeking the avoidance and recovery of allegedly preferential and/or fraudulent transfers under Sections 547, 548 and 550 of the Bankruptcy Code. The Liquidating Trustee also seeks to disallow claims of such defendants under Sections 502(d) and (j) of the Bankruptcy Code.

On June 13, 2017, The Original Soupman, Inc. and its affiliates (collectively “Debtors” or “Original Soupman”) commenced voluntary bankruptcy proceedings under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. According to its petition, Original Soupman estimates that its assets are between $1 million and $10 million, and its liabilities are between $10 million and $50 million.

On May 17, 2017, GulfMark Offshore, Inc. (“GulfMark” or “Debtor”) filed a voluntary petition for bankruptcy relief under chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code in the United States District Court for the District of Delaware.

Starting on April 28, 2017, Craig R. Jalbert, as Distribution Trustee of the Corinthian Distribution Trust, filed approximately 122 complaints seeking the avoidance and recovery of allegedly preferential and/or fraudulent transfers under Sections 547, 548, 549 and and 550 of the Bankruptcy Code (depending upon the nature of the underlying transactions). The Distribution Trustee also seeks to disallow claims of such defendants under Sections 502(d) and (j) of the Bankruptcy Code.

Whether a claim against company management is direct or derivative is not infrequently disputed in litigation before the Delaware Court of Chancery. This determination becomes important in many contexts, including whether it was necessary for plaintiff to make a pre-suit demand upon the board, whether derivative claims of a company have been assigned to a receiver, or whether such claims have previously been settled in a prior litigation.

Not uncommonly, a preference complaint fails to adequately allege that the transfers sought to be recovered by the trustee were made “for or on account of an antecedent debt owed by the debtor before such transfer was made”, as required under Section 547(b) of the Bankruptcy Code. Thus, when faced with a complaint to recover alleged preferential transfers, a defendant can proceed in one of two ways: (i) file an answer and raise affirmative defenses, or (ii) move to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).

In the recent decision of In re Molycorp, Inc., 562 B.R. 67 (Bankr. D. Del. 2017), Judge Sontchi held that a carve-out provision in a DIP financing order did not act as an absolute limit on the fees and expenses payable to counsel to the creditors committee in a case with a confirmed chapter 11 plan.