In our last blogpost (here) we reported how the court had, for the first time, exercised its power under s. 901C(4) Companies Act 2006 to exclude a company’s members and all but one class of its creditors from voting on a restructuring plan under Part 26A. The facts of this case are set out in more detail in that blogpost.

Summary

For the first time, the court has exercised its power under s. 901C(4) Companies Act 2006 to exclude a company’s members and all but one class of its creditors from voting on a restructuring plan under Part 26A. The court was satisfied that only one class of creditors had a genuine economic interest in the company and noted that “this was not a marginal case”.

Key drivers for the court’s decision (see more detail below) were:

There has been much debate in recent years around the use made of certain UK restructuring tools – the company voluntary arrangement and, more recently, the new restructuring plan – to restructure commercial property leases. Commercial tenants argue that compromise is necessary to address high fixed costs that are no longer sustainable, but landlords have often been critical of the approach taken. This debate has become more acute in the context of the pandemic, as many High Street businesses subject to mandatory closure have built up significant rent arrears that need to be addressed.

There has been much debate in recent years around the use made of certain UK restructuring tools – the company voluntary arrangement and, more recently, the new restructuring plan – to restructure commercial property leases. Commercial tenants argue that compromise is necessary to address high fixed costs that are no longer sustainable, but landlords have often been critical of the approach taken. This debate has become more acute in the context of the pandemic, as many High Street businesses subject to mandatory closure have built up significant rent arrears that need to be addressed.

On July 6-7, 2017, Craig Jalbert, in his capacity as Trustee for F2 Liquidating Trust, filed approximately 187 complaints seeking the avoidance and recovery of allegedly preferential and/or fraudulent transfers under Sections 547, 548 and 550 of the Bankruptcy Code (depending on the nature of the claims). In certain instances, the Trustee also seeks to disallow claims of such defendants under Sections 502(d) and (j) of the Bankruptcy Code.

On June 15, 2017, Curtis R. Smith, as Liquidating Trustee of the Hastings Creditors’ Liquidating Trust, filed approximately 69 complaints seeking the avoidance and recovery of allegedly preferential and/or fraudulent transfers under Sections 547, 548 and 550 of the Bankruptcy Code. The Liquidating Trustee also seeks to disallow claims of such defendants under Sections 502(d) and (j) of the Bankruptcy Code.

On June 13, 2017, The Original Soupman, Inc. and its affiliates (collectively “Debtors” or “Original Soupman”) commenced voluntary bankruptcy proceedings under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. According to its petition, Original Soupman estimates that its assets are between $1 million and $10 million, and its liabilities are between $10 million and $50 million.

On May 17, 2017, GulfMark Offshore, Inc. (“GulfMark” or “Debtor”) filed a voluntary petition for bankruptcy relief under chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code in the United States District Court for the District of Delaware.

Starting on April 28, 2017, Craig R. Jalbert, as Distribution Trustee of the Corinthian Distribution Trust, filed approximately 122 complaints seeking the avoidance and recovery of allegedly preferential and/or fraudulent transfers under Sections 547, 548, 549 and and 550 of the Bankruptcy Code (depending upon the nature of the underlying transactions). The Distribution Trustee also seeks to disallow claims of such defendants under Sections 502(d) and (j) of the Bankruptcy Code.

Whether a claim against company management is direct or derivative is not infrequently disputed in litigation before the Delaware Court of Chancery. This determination becomes important in many contexts, including whether it was necessary for plaintiff to make a pre-suit demand upon the board, whether derivative claims of a company have been assigned to a receiver, or whether such claims have previously been settled in a prior litigation.