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Asset freeze measures enacted by the United Kingdom against designated persons (DPs) can, under certain circumstances, extend to entities “owned or controlled” by DPs. To date, there have been few—and at times partly contradictory—English court cases addressing the “ownership and control” criteria under the UK sanctions regime. The latest judgment in Hellard v OJSC Rossiysky Kredit Bank sought to reconcile the previous guidance provided by the courts in the Mints and Litasco cases.

An insolvency moratorium first introduced during the COVID-19 pandemic applies to nearly all Russian legal entities, individuals, and sole entrepreneurs, and bans the commencement of insolvency proceedings against Russian obligors.

In response to the coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic, Russia has changed its bankruptcy laws to provide for a moratorium on bankruptcies and a freeze on certain transactions. While the situation is dynamic, these amendments are relevant for ongoing or potential transactions in Russia, as well as a party’s ability to enforce pledges and other types of security interests or to seek other remedies against Russian companies.

Yesterday, the Special Inspector General for the Trouble Asset Relief Program (SIGTARP) released a report criticizing the Treasury Department’s role in the accelerated closure of hundreds of GM and Chrysler dealerships.

On Tuesday, the Bank of Spain released details regarding the status of the restructuring of the Spanish savings bank sector, in what it called “the biggest overhaul of the Spanish banking sector in recent history.” The Bank also provided details regarding funding for bank restructurings supplied by the Fund for the Orderly Restructuring of the Banking Sector (FROB),

Yesterday, the U.K. Treasury announced that it had published a report setting out detailed proposals for the effective management and resolution of failed investment banks.

Today, the House Judiciary Committee’s Subcommittee on Commercial and Administrative Law held a hearing to discuss the role of bankruptcy and antitrust law in financial regulatory reform, particularly with respect to institutions that may be regarded as “too big to fail,” as highlighted during the financial crisis.

Testifying before the Subcommittee were the following witnesses:

Panel I