Fulltext Search

In Lehman Brothers Special Financing, Inc. v. Ballyrock ABS CDO 2007-1 Limited (In re Lehman Brothers Holdings, Inc.), Adv. P. No. 09-01032 (JMP) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. May 12, 2011) [hereinafter “Ballyrock”], the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York held that a contractual provision that subordinates the priority of a termination payment owing under a credit default swap (CDS) to a debtor in bankruptcy, and which caps the amount of the termination payment, may be an unenforceable ipso facto clause under section 541(c)(1)(B).

In Geltzer v. Mooney (In re MacMenamin’s Grill, Ltd.), Adv. Pro. No. 09-8266 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. April 21, 2011), the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York held that the safe harbor in section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code does not apply to a small, private leveraged buyout (LBO) transaction that posed no systemic risk to the stability of the financial markets.

The court has a limited discretion not to make a bankruptcy order where the debt is the subject of a statutory demand which has not been paid and is outstanding at the time of the bankruptcy petition hearing.

In circumstances where a debtor lacks mental capacity to deal with a statutory demand and subsequent bankruptcy petition, the court will rescind or annul a bankruptcy order.

The Insolvency Service has published its policy, which came into effect on 1 December 2010, on realising a bankrupt's principal residence where the Official Receiver (OR) is appointed as the trustee in bankruptcy.

The policy provides that the OR will not take any steps to market the bankrupt's interest in the property for a period of two years and three months from the date of the bankruptcy order. However, the OR can accept any unsolicited offer in relation to the property if it is in the best interest of creditors. After the expiry of the two years and three months:

A notice of intention to appoint administrators (a Notice), although not an absolute bar to making a final charging order, will generally act as a moratorium. This prevents creditors from taking steps to enforce their claims against a company without the permission of the court.

The court has held that a statutory demand is valid despite the high default interest rate on an underlying loan.

When a company goes into administration, time does not stop running against its creditors' claims for the purposes of the Limitation Act 1980. This is different to where a company goes into liquidation as time does then stop running. The effect there is that the claim stays live whereas in an administration, once the limitation period has expired, the claim is time-barred.

A party cannot appeal a decision made in bankruptcy proceedings by reason only of a personal interest in the outcome. An economic interest is a pre-requisite.

This was confirmed by the court in Sands and another v Monem and another, in which the bankrupt had transferred the interest in his home to his wife before being made bankrupt. The transfer was made allegedly in order to settle a debt, although this was not reflected in the documentation. That transfer was successfully set aside as a preference by the bankrupt's trustee.