The interaction between the principles of insolvency law and the Coronavirus Job Retention Scheme (JRS) have come into sharp focus in recent weeks, with the administrators of Carluccio's and Debenhams seeking guidance from the English courts about how the scheme impacts on their obligations to employees.
As part of its response to the COVID-19 situation, Companies House has announced that it will accept the filing of statutory insolvency documents via emailed PDF attachments.
This measure applies to companies registered in Scotland, as well as England & Wales and is yet another practical example of the steps being taken to try and alleviate the administrative burden on insolvency practitioners.
It is perhaps not as well-known as it should be that the Bankruptcy (Scotland) Act 2016 sections 195 – 198 provides a six-week moratorium – effectively a postponement or period of protection from action to recover debts - to individuals, partnerships and trusts facing financial distress or liquidity issues.
The moratorium provides breathing space to allow parties to be protected from their creditors while they take advice and consider what debt relief options might be available to them.
A party can normally apply for the moratorium once in any 12-month period.
Wrongful trading rules, which can result in directors being personally liable for losses incurred as a result of continued trading, are being temporarily suspended in recognition of the large number of businesses being impacted by COVID-19. While this news will be welcomed by businesses across the UK, directors should not be complacent about their responsibilities.
The liquidation of Thomas Cook Group last month – and the ensuing cancellation of all flights and repatriation of 140,000+ customers – has prompted fresh scrutiny of the UK’s approach to airline insolvency.
When considering whether or not to bring a legal action, it is important to establish if it is competent and commercially worthwhile to do so. The ability to bring, or continue with, legal proceedings against a company can be restricted if that company enters into a formal insolvency process. The position of creditors may be improved now that the Third Party (Rights Against Insurers) Act 2010 has at last been brought into force.
In Lewis Brothers Bakeries, Inc. and Chicago Baking Co. v. Interstate Brands Corp. (2014 WL 2535294 (8th Cir. June 6, 2014)), the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, sitting en banc, held that a perpetual, royalty-free, assignable, transferable, exclusive trademark license granted in connection with a substantially consummated asset purchase agreement was not an executory contract that could be assumed or rejected by the licensor-debtor in bankruptcy.
On February 4, 2014, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of New Jersey in In re Surma, 2014 WL 413572 (Bankr. D.N.J. Feb. 4, 2014), held that rents were not property of the debtor’s bankruptcy estate because they were subject to an absolute and unconditional assignment of rents in favor of the secured lender. As a result, the court concluded that the debtor may not, through his Chapter 11 plan of reorganization, use or allocate rents.
Background
TheLehman Brothers bankruptcy court has determined that the contractually specified methodology for conducting the liquidation of a swap agreement is protected by the safe harbor provisions of the bankruptcy, even if the selected methodology would be more favorable to the non-defaulting counterparty than the liquidation methodology that would apply absent the bankruptcy.See Michigan State Housing Dev. Auth. v. Lehman Bros. Deriv. Prods. Inc. (In re Lehman Bros. Holdings Inc.), No. 08-13555, ---B.R.
The outcome of the TOUSA appeal has been much anticipated and closely watched by the lending community, their counsel and advisors, and legal scholars. On May 15, 2012, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals issued its opinion (found here), reversing the District Court for the Southern District of Florida and affirming the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Florida, at least insofar as to the bankruptcy court’s factual findings, but not remedies.