Oil price movement through 2014 and into 2015 is a consequence of market fundamentals. Europe’s continued economic woes, paired with the slowdown in China’s economy, have led to a fall in demand for oil.

At the same time, the growing U.S. shale-oil boom (over which OPEC has no control) and the pick-up in drilling in Libya have led to an excess of supply. However, in the past few months the issue has switched from how quickly oil prices have fallen, to how much further they have to fall.

Changes may be coming to the Bankruptcy Code’s safe harbor provisions.[1] In 2012 the American Bankruptcy Institute established a Commission to Study the Reform of Chapter 11 (the “ABI Commission”), composed of many well-respected restructuring practitioners, including two of the original drafters of the Bankruptcy Code, whose advice holds great weight in the restructuring community.

An updated Statement of Insolvency Practice (SIP) relating to pre-packaged sales in administrations has been issued by the Joint Insolvency Committee, effective from 1 November 2013. The new SIP aims to provide greater clarity for creditors, with insolvency practitioners (IPs) having to provide earlier notification of the pre-packaged sale and more detail as to the circumstances surrounding, and terms of, the sale transaction.

A judgment recently handed down from the High Court clarifies the obligations of liquidators under the Data Protection Act 1998, providing them with greater personal protection from fines or other sanctions.

Reed Smith acted for the liquidators in their application for directions.

Background

Summary

The Supreme Court has today allowed an appeal against the decision of the Court of Appeal (14 October 2011) which, in certain circumstances in an insolvency situation, would have accorded “super priority” to a financial support direction made by the Pensions Regulator.

The English Supreme Court’s eagerly awaited decision on the Eurosail litigation, concerning how the “balance sheet” test for insolvency should be applied, was released today. The decision clarifies how courts should apply the balance sheet test, and what circumstances and facts must be taken into account in doing so.

Balance sheet test must take into account commercial context of company

A recent Isle of Man case, Interdevelco Limited v. Waste2energy Group Holdings plc, demonstrates that the debate around how courts should approach international insolvency legislation rages on. The decision emphasised the importance of the principle of universality, the concept that there should be one insolvency proceeding under which all creditors’ claims can be collectively assessed and administered. This approach contrasts with that taken by the Supreme Court of England and Wales in the two recent cases of Rubin v.

In a case with truly global implications, the Supreme Court of England and Wales held earlier today that judgments of U.S. Bankruptcy Courts against foreign defendants who had not submitted to the Bankruptcy Court’s jurisdiction were not enforceable in England and Wales in the case of Rubin v. Eurofinance SA.

Factual Background

The outcome of the TOUSA appeal has been much anticipated and closely watched by the lending community, their counsel and advisors, and legal scholars. On May 15, 2012, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals issued its opinion (found here), reversing the District Court for the Southern District of Florida and affirming the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Florida, at least insofar as to the bankruptcy court’s factual findings, but not remedies.

In Lehman Brothers Special Financing, Inc. v. Ballyrock ABS CDO 2007-1 Limited (In re Lehman Brothers Holdings, Inc.), Adv. P. No. 09-01032 (JMP) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. May 12, 2011) [hereinafter “Ballyrock”], the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York held that a contractual provision that subordinates the priority of a termination payment owing under a credit default swap (CDS) to a debtor in bankruptcy, and which caps the amount of the termination payment, may be an unenforceable ipso facto clause under section 541(c)(1)(B).