Liability management transactions which may favour a subset of creditors over another are increasingly common in the US leveraged finance markets. 2024 may be seen as the year in which these US imports began to make a real impact in Europe. Which strategies could creditors employ to protect themselves from unfavourable treatment where such transactions are attempted?
Senior secured creditors, being the anchor creditor in the capital stack, will always be focused on ensuring their priority claim is as robust as possible, with clearly delineated capacity for 'super priority' debt. However, today's documentary flexibilities, coupled with local legal restrictions, can mean senior secured creditors are not as 'senior secured' as they think. Here are some points to think about.
Super Senior Debt
HEADLINES
- In March 2020, credit insurer Euler Hermes forecast a 43% increase in insolvencies in the UK in 2021, as well as a 26% uptick in France and 12% in Germany
- By December 2020, ratings agency S&P was forecasting European defaults rising to as much as 8% by the end of 2021
There have been fewer European insolvencies and restructurings than anticipated during the COVID-19 pandemic, but distressed deal activity may accelerate as soon as economies are finally able to reopen.
Changes may be coming to the Bankruptcy Code’s safe harbor provisions.[1] In 2012 the American Bankruptcy Institute established a Commission to Study the Reform of Chapter 11 (the “ABI Commission”), composed of many well-respected restructuring practitioners, including two of the original drafters of the Bankruptcy Code, whose advice holds great weight in the restructuring community.
A Western District of New York bankruptcy court has held that the safe harbor provisions of section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code apply to leveraged buy-outs of privately held securities. See Cyganowski v. Lapides (In re Batavia Nursing Home, LLC), No. 12-1145 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. July 29, 2013).
On June 25, 2013, the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York (the “Court”) issued a memorandum decision in the Lehman Brothers SIPA proceeding1 holding that claims asserted by certain repurchase agreement (“repo”) counterparties (the “Representative Claimants”) did not qualify for treatment as customer claims under SIPA.
Few courts have construed the meaning of “repurchase agreement” as used in the Bankruptcy Code, so the recent HomeBanc1 case out of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware is a must-read for “repo” counterparties. The principal issue in HomeBanc was whether several zero purchase price repo transactions under the parties’ contract for the sale and repurchase of mortgage-backed securities fell within the definition of a “repurchase agreement” in Section 101(47) of the Bankruptcy Code.
The outcome of the TOUSA appeal has been much anticipated and closely watched by the lending community, their counsel and advisors, and legal scholars. On May 15, 2012, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals issued its opinion (found here), reversing the District Court for the Southern District of Florida and affirming the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Florida, at least insofar as to the bankruptcy court’s factual findings, but not remedies.
On December 22, 2011, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware inIn re JER/Jameson Mezz Borrower II LLC 1 dismissed with prejudice a mezzanine borrower’s bankruptcy case for bad faith under Section 1112(b) of the Bankruptcy Code. In doing so, the court clarified that the standard in the Third Circuit to evaluate the good faith of a debtor seeking shelter under the umbrella of Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code is an objective one and does not consider the subjective good faith of a debtor as do courts within the Secon d Circuit.
In Lehman Brothers Special Financing, Inc. v. Ballyrock ABS CDO 2007-1 Limited (In re Lehman Brothers Holdings, Inc.), Adv. P. No. 09-01032 (JMP) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. May 12, 2011) [hereinafter “Ballyrock”], the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York held that a contractual provision that subordinates the priority of a termination payment owing under a credit default swap (CDS) to a debtor in bankruptcy, and which caps the amount of the termination payment, may be an unenforceable ipso facto clause under section 541(c)(1)(B).