Changes may be coming to the Bankruptcy Code’s safe harbor provisions.[1] In 2012 the American Bankruptcy Institute established a Commission to Study the Reform of Chapter 11 (the “ABI Commission”), composed of many well-respected restructuring practitioners, including two of the original drafters of the Bankruptcy Code, whose advice holds great weight in the restructuring community.

In In re Louisiana Riverboat Gaming P’ship (Global Gaming Legends, LLC v. Legends Gaming of Louisana-1, LLC) (“Global Gaming”), the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Louisiana stayed discovery in an adversary proceeding pending decision on a party’s motion to withdraw the reference to the district court, finding too much risk that the bankruptcy court would later be found to be without authority to handle pre-trial discovery for the “Stern-governed” core claims at issue. Adv. Proc. No. 13AP-1007 (Bankr. W.D. La. Jan. 10, 2014).

In an adversary proceeding filed in the American Home Mortgage Holdings, Inc. bankruptcy case, the Delaware bankruptcy court affirmed that triangular setoffs are not allowed under the Bankruptcy Code and cannot be modified by contract or under the Bankruptcy Code’s safe harbor provision. In re American Home Mortgage Holdings, Inc., et al., Adv. Proc. No. 11-51851 (Bankr. D. Del. Nov. 8, 2013). Two contracts were at issue – a swap agreement between a bank and American Home Mortgage Investment Corp.

A Western District of New York bankruptcy court has held that the safe harbor provisions of section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code apply to leveraged buy-outs of privately held securities. See Cyganowski v. Lapides (In re Batavia Nursing Home, LLC), No. 12-1145 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. July 29, 2013).

On June 25, 2013, the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York (the “Court”) issued a memorandum decision in the Lehman Brothers SIPA proceeding¹ holding that claims asserted by certain repurchase agreement (“repo”) counterparties (the “Representative Claimants”) did not qualify for treatment as customer claims under SIPA.

In re Big M, Inc., No. 13-10233 (DHS), 2013 WL 1681489 (Bankr. D.N.J. April 17, 2013). In Big M, the Bankruptcy Court for the District of New Jersey (the “Bankruptcy Court”) held that the debtor’s privilege did not pass to the creditors’ committee, even though the creditors’ committee obtained authority to investigate certain of the debtor’s causes of action, because the committee was acting as a fiduciary to creditors as opposed to the debtor’s estate.

Few courts have construed the meaning of “repurchase agreement” as used in the Bankruptcy Code, so the recent HomeBanc¹ case out of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware is a must-read for “repo” counterparties. The principal issue in HomeBanc was whether several zero purchase price repo transactions under the parties’ contract for the sale and repurchase of mortgage-backed securities fell within the definition of a “repurchase agreement” in Section 101(47) of the Bankruptcy Code.

The outcome of the TOUSA appeal has been much anticipated and closely watched by the lending community, their counsel and advisors, and legal scholars. On May 15, 2012, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals issued its opinion (found here), reversing the District Court for the Southern District of Florida and affirming the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Florida, at least insofar as to the bankruptcy court’s factual findings, but not remedies.

On December 22, 2011, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware inIn re JER/Jameson Mezz Borrower II LLC ¹ dismissed with prejudice a mezzanine borrower’s bankruptcy case for bad faith under Section 1112(b) of the Bankruptcy Code. In doing so, the court clarified that the standard in the Third Circuit to evaluate the good faith of a debtor seeking shelter under the umbrella of Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code is an objective one and does not consider the subjective good faith of a debtor as do courts within the Secon d Circuit.

In Lehman Brothers Special Financing, Inc. v. Ballyrock ABS CDO 2007-1 Limited (In re Lehman Brothers Holdings, Inc.), Adv. P. No. 09-01032 (JMP) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. May 12, 2011) [hereinafter “Ballyrock”], the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York held that a contractual provision that subordinates the priority of a termination payment owing under a credit default swap (CDS) to a debtor in bankruptcy, and which caps the amount of the termination payment, may be an unenforceable ipso facto clause under section 541(c)(1)(B).