Overview

The appointment of an independent director is a powerful tool for private credit lenders. The appointment is designed to introduce a voice of neutrality and fairness into the board’s decision-making process with the hope and expectation that independence from the controlling shareholder enables the board to drive toward viable value-maximizing strategies. Often times, the independent director is vested with exclusive authority (or veto rights) over a range of significant corporate decisions, including a sale, restructuring and the decision to file a bankruptcy case.

One common denominator links nearly all stressed businesses: tight liquidity. After the liquidity hole is identified and sized, the discussion inevitably turns to the question of who will fund the necessary capital to extend the liquidity runway. For a PE-backed business where there is a credible path to recovery, a sponsor, due to its existing equity stake, is often willing to inject additional capital into an underperforming portfolio company.

Background

The defining feature of the restructuring plan, which was introduced by the Corporate Insolvency and Governance Act 2020, is the "cross class cram down" ("CCCD") mechanism it introduces as a means of imposing a settlement on recalcitrant creditors.

Overview

Judgment was handed down on 30 September sanctioning the much-trailed restructuring plans for the Cineworld UK group of companies. The sanctioning of the Plans was widely expected, but drama came at the eleventh hour as a result of two last minute challenges brought by UK Commercial Property Finance Holdings ("UKCP") and the Crown Estate (both landlords of Cineworld leases). UKCP and the Crown Estate sought injunctions - not to challenge the Plans in themselves - but to order the removal of their leases from the Plans. 

In a much-anticipated decision, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit recently held that unsecured noteholders’ claims against a debtor for certain “Applicable Premiums” were the “economic equivalent” to unmatured interest and, therefore, not recoverable under section 502(b)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code.

As you know from our prior alerts, creditors of borrowers formed as Delaware LLCs (as opposed to corporations) lack standing under Delaware law to sue directors for breaching fiduciary duties even when, to the surprise of many, the LLC is insolvent. See our prior Alert. The disparity of substantive creditor rights depending entirely on corporate form results from two aspects of Delaware law.

There is a growing trend of bankruptcy courts approving structured dismissals of chapter 11 cases following a successful sale of a debtor’s assets under section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code. A structured dismissal is a cost‑effective way for a debtor to exit chapter 11 and is an alternative to (a) confirming a post‑sale liquidating plan, which is expensive and not always viable, or (b) converting the case to chapter 7, which introduces significant uncertainty and unpredictability with the appointment of a chapter 7 trustee to replace management.

On 9 February, the High Court handed down its judgement on Re Link Fund Solutions Ltd [2024] EWHC 250 (Ch) (the "Link Case").

Bankruptcy Considerations for Unitranche Transactions with Super-Priority Revolvers without an AAL