Sophisticated real estate lenders spend significant amounts of time and energy attempting to insulate themselves from potential bankruptcy filings by their borrowers. A primary reason, which many an experienced real estate lender has found out the hard way, is the risk that a debtor in bankruptcy may “cram down” a plan of reorganization over its lender’s objection. Under a typical cramdown plan, a debtor may stretch out payments to its secured creditor for several years and attempt to replace its negotiated interest rate with a new, below- market rate of interest.

On August 26, 2014, Judge Robert D. Drain of the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York issued a bench ruling in In re MPM Silicones, LLC, Case No. 14-22503 (RDD), on several aspects of the plan of reorganization filed by debtor Momentive Performance Materials, Inc., a specialty chemicals manufacturing company, and its affiliated debtors.

The absolute priority rule ordinarily prevents a Chapter 11 debtor from distributing any money or property to junior creditors and old equity investors unless all senior creditors have first been paid in full. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii). Nevertheless, old equity investors may attempt to receive new equity in the reorganized debtor in consideration for providing new (post-bankruptcy) investments in the debtor.

Bankruptcy Code § 1129(a)(10) provides that in order for a plan proponent to “cram down” - i.e., force acceptance of - a plan of reorganization on a dissenting class of creditors, at least one impaired class of creditors must vote in favor of the plan. Because a plan is often not accepted by all classes entitled to vote, the ability to procure at least one impaired, accepting class in order to cram down a dissenting class is essential in achieving plan confirmation.

In what it described as “an easy decision,” the U.S. Supreme Court issued its eagerly anticipated decision in RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC et al. v. Amalgamated Bank¹ on May 29, 2012.