Successful bankruptcy cases typically end with a court order releasing a debtor from liability for most pre-bankruptcy debts. This order, generally known as a “discharge order,” prohibits the debtor’s creditors from trying to collect on those now-discharged debts. See 11 U.S.C. § 524(a)(2). But it is not always clear which debts are covered by a discharge order. Some pre-bankruptcy debts are exempted from discharge by the Bankruptcy Code.

In Mission Product Holdings, Inc. v. Tempnology, LLC, 587 U.S. ___ (2019), the Supreme Court held that a debtor’s rejection of a trademark license does not eliminate the licensee’s right to use the trademark through the completion of the contract, settling a split in the Circuits. The Supreme Court also ruled that the case was not moot, despite the bankruptcy estate’s distribution of all of its assets, which may have important implications for the developing jurisprudence on mootness in bankruptcy cases.

Two weeks ago, we discussed asset sales under Bankruptcy Code section 363. As that post noted, section 363 requires court approval for asset sales outside the ordinary course of business, with courts ensuring that sales reflect a reasonable business judgment and have an articulated business justification. Debtors may choose to sell assets via a public auction or through a private sale.

When a debtor files for bankruptcy, almost all proceedings to recover property from the debtor are automatically stayed by force of law. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a). This provision, known as the automatic stay, is a central feature of the bankruptcy process, but uncertainty remains about aspects of its scope.

In In re 1141 Realty Owner LLC, et al., No. 18-12341 (SMB), 2019 WL 1270818 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. March 18, 2019), Bankruptcy Judge Stuart M. Bernstein of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court of the Southern District of New York recently reaffirmed that upon sufficient contractual language, "make whole" prepayment premiums are enforceable under New York law even after loan acceleration. The court emphasized that the language of the contract provided for such a result and that this was an enforceable liquidated damages clause under New York law.

In a unanimous 25 February panel decision, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that the trustee liquidating Bernard L. Madoff’s investment firm can claw back billions in Ponzi scheme proceeds from investors who received the proceeds indirectly through non-U.S. “feeder funds” (funds that aggregate investor capital to invest in funds such as Madoff’s).

In a recent decision, EMA GARP Fund v. Banro Corporation, No. 18 CIV. 1986 (KPF), 2019 WL 773988 (S.D.N.Y. 21 February 2019), District Judge Katherine Polk Failla of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York enforced a foreign reorganization plan in the United States on the basis of international comity, notwithstanding that no application for recognition and enforcement had been made under Chapter 15 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code. Banro Corp.

In a unanimous 25 February panel decision, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that the trustee liquidating Bernard L. Madoff's investment firm can claw back billions in Ponzi scheme proceeds from investors who received the proceeds indirectly through non-U.S. "feeder funds" (funds that aggregate investor capital to invest in funds such as Madoff's).

When a party files for bankruptcy, the Bankruptcy Code imposes an automatic stay of litigation against a debtor for claims arising prior to the commencement of the bankruptcy case. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a). Where there is a basis for bankruptcy jurisdiction in federal court, federal law also permits parties to a state court action to remove the state court action to the federal district court for the district in which the state court action is pending. See 28 U.S.C. § 1452(a).

Fraudulent transfer law allows creditors and bankruptcy trustees, under certain circumstances, to sue transferees to recover funds received where a debtor’s transfers to the transferees actually or constructively defrauded its creditors. Under both the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act adopted by most states and the fraudulent transfer action created by federal bankruptcy law, a transferee of an alleged fraudulent transfer may assert a defense from such liability by establishing that it received the transfer in good faith and for reasonably equivalent value. See 11 U.S.C.