Deal structure matters, particularly in bankruptcy. The Third Circuit recently ruled that a creditor’s right to future royalty payments in a non-executory contract could be discharged in the counterparty-debtor’s bankruptcy. The decision highlights the importance of properly structuring M&A, earn-out, and royalty-based transactions to ensure creditors receive the benefit of their bargain — even (or especially) if their counterparty later encounters financial distress.

Background

Until recently, courts in the Ninth Circuit have generally followed the minority view that non-debtor releases in a bankruptcy plan are prohibited by Bankruptcy Code Section 524(e), which provides that the “discharge of a debt of the debtor does not affect the liability of any other entity on, or the property of any other entity for, such debt.” In the summer of 2020, the Ninth Circuit hinted that its prohibition against non-debtor releases was not absolute, when the court issued its decision in Blixseth v. Credit Suisse, 961 F.3d 1074 (9th Cir.

If a creditor is holding property of a party that files bankruptcy, is it “exercising control over” such property (and violating the automatic stay) by refusing the debtor’s turnover demands? According to the Supreme Court, the answer is no – instead, the stay under Section 362(a)(3) of the Bankruptcy Code only applies to affirmative acts that disturb the status quo as of the filing date. In other words, the mere retention of property of a debtor after the filing of a bankruptcy case does not violate the automatic stay.

The Supreme Court in Sevilleja v Marex Financial Ltd [2020] UKSC 31 has brought much needed clarity to the legal basis and scope of the so-called ‘reflective loss’ principle. The effect of the decision is a ‘bright line’ rule that bars claims by shareholders for loss in value of their shares arising as a consequence of the company having suffered loss, in respect of which the company has a cause of action against the same wrong-doer.

Leveraged loans continue to be a topic of interest in the current environment, particularly when they are pooled and securitized as collateralized loan obligations. A recent decision sheds light on whether and when leveraged loans and similar instruments may be classified as securities and, therefore, be subject to securities laws.

A recent decision of the High Court of New Zealand provides helpful guidance for insolvency practitioners on how aspects of the voluntary administration regime should operate in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic.

On 30 March 2020, the board of directors of EncoreFX (NZ) Limited resolved to appoint administrators to the company. By then, New Zealand was already at Level 4 on the four-level alert system for COVID-19.

The UK Court of Appeal has held that legal privilege outlasts the dissolution of a company in Addlesee v Dentons Europe LLP [2019] EWCA Civ 1600.

Legal advice privilege applies to communications between a client and its lawyers. The general rule is that those communications cannot be disclosed to third parties unless and until the client waives the privilege.

The High Court in DHC Assets Ltd v Arnerich [2019] NZHC 1695 recently considered an application under s 301 of the Companies Act (the Act) seeking to recover $1,088,156 against the former director of a liquidated company (Vaco). The plaintiff had a construction contract with Vaco and said it had not been paid for all the work it performed under that contract.

Regan v Brougham [2019] NZCA 401 clarifies what is needed to establish a valid guarantee.

A Term Loan Agreement was entered into whereby Christine Regan and Mark Tuffin lent $50,000 to B & R Enterprises Ltd. Rachael Dey and Bryce Brougham were named as Guarantors. Bryce Brougham was the only guarantor to sign the agreement. The Company was put into liquidation and a demand made against the Guarantor.

The guarantor argued that the guarantee was not enforceable based on the following:

The Court of Appeal in 90 Nine Limited v Luxury Rentals NZ Limited [2019] NZCA 424 allowed an appeal from a creditor in respect of an application to liquidate the respondent over a failure to pay a statutory demand.