The English Court of Appeal has recently decided that a corporation that held shares in a company remained a shareholder notwithstanding the shareholding company's dissolution.

BWE Estates Limited had two shareholders: an individual named David who held 75% of its shares and a company, Belvedere Limited, which held the remaining 25%. Although Belvedere was dissolved in 1996, it remained listed as a shareholder in BWE's share register.

In the English High Court, the joint administrators of four English companies within the former Lehman Brothers group sought directions from the Court in respect of a proposed settlement. The settlement would put to rest substantial inter-company claims including those at issue in the 'Waterfall III' proceedings.

In a second application heard on the same day, Hildyard J considered an application by the administrators of Lehman Brothers Europe Limited (LBEL) for directions that would enable a surplus to be distributed to the sole member of LBEL while LBEL remained in administration. The proposed scheme had material benefits for both shareholders and creditors. The administrators acknowledged that the orders sought were an indirect means of circumventing the Insolvency Act 1986 (UK), which does not expressly provide for directors to make distributions during an administration.

The Court of Appeal has recently dismissed an appeal from the High Court's judgment (discussed in our September 2016 update) setting aside a compromise under Part 14 of the Companies Act 1993 after finding that the challenging creditors, who had voted against the compromise, had been unfairly prejudiced by the decision to call only one meeting of creditors.

In Day v The Official Assignee as Liquidator of GN Networks Ltd (in Liq) [2016] NZHC 2400, the High Court rejected a claim that the funding arrangement at issue constituted maintenance or champerty.

The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York recently held that a confirmable Chapter 13 plan cannot both “vest” title to real property and “surrender” that property to a secured lender, and that the secured lender may refuse to accept the vesting in satisfaction of its claim.

Thus, the Court held that a debtor may not force the transfer of title in collateral to a secured creditor in satisfaction of the secured creditor’s claim, without the consent of the secured creditor.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit recently affirmed the dismissal of a borrower’s lawsuit against a bank, holding that the district court correctly found that sale orders entered in a prior bankruptcy case were res judicata and precluded the borrower’s new claims.

A copy of the opinion is available at:  Link to Opinion.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit recently held that a bankruptcy court clearly erred in its finding that a debtor proposed a Chapter 11 plan in good faith, when the secured mortgagee would be paid only in part and very slowly after 10 years with no obligation by the debtor to maintain the building and obtain insurance, while a second class would be paid in full in two payments of $1,200 each over 60 days.

The U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Florida recently denied a mortgagee’s motion to reopen a Chapter 7 case to compel the surrender of real property, due to a five-year delay in filing the motion.

In so ruling, the court agreed with an earlier ruling from the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of Florida (In re Plummer, 513 B.R. 135 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2014)), distinguishing “surrender” from “foreclosure,” and holding that a creditor cannot use the Bankruptcy Code to circumvent the obligations imposed by state law.

Two years ago, in Simon v. FIA Card Services, N.A., the Third Circuit held that alleged violations of the FDCPA resulting from conduct in a bankruptcy case were not precluded by the Bankruptcy Code.