In Navarac v Pty Ltd v Carrello [2016] WASC 327, the court-appointed receiver and manager of Esperance Cattle Company Pty Ltd had applied for orders from the court to conclude the receivership.
In order to prepare evidence and submissions to oppose the receiver's application, a director of the company applied to inspect certain documents, which she asserted were or might be held by the receiver.
In State of Victoria v Goulburn Administration Services (In Liquidation) & Ors [2016] VSC 654, the Victoria Supreme Court appointed two partners of Ernst & Young (EY) as special purpose liquidators (SPLs) of two companies, despite EY's involvement in carrying out contractual compliance audits before those companies went into liquidation.
In Re PrimeSpace Property Investment Limited (In Liquidation) [2016] NSWSC 1450 the Supreme Court of New South Wales was asked to consider whether it could make directions in respect of the investigation of the affairs of a corporate trustee (whose only assets were held on trust). The company, as trustee, had guaranteed a loan from a third party and also granted that third party first option on several apartments.
Deep Purple was, and still is, a rock music band. Its members included Mr Gillan, Mr Glover and Mr Paice. In 2005, band members entered into an agreement with HEC Enterprises Limited (HEC) and Deep Purple (Overseas) Limited (DPO). Under that agreement, the parties agreed to form a new company named Purpletuity, to which various copyrights and other assets were to be transferred. In 2015, Mr Gillan, Mr Glover and Mr Paice commenced proceedings against HEC and DPO to enforce that agreement.
In Mclean v Trustees of the Bankruptcy Estate of Dent [2016] EWHC 2650, the High Court considered the application of the equitable doctrines of marshalling and subrogation in relation to a fixed charge over (among other things) a dog.
A company and partnership borrowed funds from two sources – Barclays Bank and Lady Morrison. Barclays held, among other things, charges over farms owned by individual partners and an agricultural charge under the Agricultural Credits Act 1928 (UK), including a charge over a dog. Lady Morrison only held charges over the farms.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit recently articulated a standard to determine what claims may be barred against a purchaser of assets "free and clear" of claims pursuant to section 363(f) of the Bankruptcy Code and highlighted procedural due process concerns with respect to enforcement.1 The decision arose out of litigation regarding certain defects, including the well-known "ignition switch defect," affecting certain GM vehicles. GM's successor (which acquired GM's assets in a section 363 sale in 2009) asserted that a "free and clear" provisi
On March 29, 2016, the Second Circuit addressed the breadth and application of the Bankruptcy Code's safe harbor provisions in an opinion that applied to two cases before it. The court analyzed whether: (i) the Bankruptcy Code's safe harbor provisions preempt individual creditors' state law fraudulent conveyance claims; and (ii) the automatic stay bars creditors from asserting such claims while the trustee is actively pursuing similar claims under the Bankruptcy Code. In In re Tribune Co.
The District Court for the Central District of California recently held that an assignee that acquired rights to a terminated swap agreement was not a "swap participant" under the Bankruptcy Code and, therefore, could not invoke safe harbors based on that status to foreclose on collateral in the face of the automatic stay. [1] The court ruled that the assignee acquired only a right to collect payment under the swap agreement, not the assignor's rights under the Bankruptcy Code to exercise remedies without first seeking court approval.
Background
On May 21, 2015, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit (the "Third Circuit") held that in rare instances a bankruptcy court may approve a "structured dismissal"- that is, a dismissal "that winds up the bankruptcy with certain conditions attached instead of simply dismissing the case and restoring the status quo ante" - that deviates from the Bankruptcy Code's priority scheme. See Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors v. CIT Group/Business Credit Inc. (In re Jevic Holding Corp.), Case No.
On October 31, 2014, Bankruptcy Judge Kaplan of the District of New Jersey addressed two issues critically important to intellectual property licensees and purchasers: (i) can a trademark licensee use section 365(n) of the Bankruptcy Code to keep licensed marks following a debtor-licensor’s rejection of a license agreement?; and (ii) can a “free and clear” sale of intellectual property eliminate any rights retained by a licensee? In re Crumbs Bake Shop, Inc., et al., 2014 WL 5508177 (Bankr. D.N.J. Oct. 31, 2014).