In State of Victoria v Goulburn Administration Services (In Liquidation) & Ors [2016] VSC 654, the Victoria Supreme Court appointed two partners of Ernst & Young (EY) as special purpose liquidators (SPLs) of two companies, despite EY's involvement in carrying out contractual compliance audits before those companies went into liquidation.

In Re PrimeSpace Property Investment Limited (In Liquidation) [2016] NSWSC 1450 the Supreme Court of New South Wales was asked to consider whether it could make directions in respect of the investigation of the affairs of a corporate trustee (whose only assets were held on trust). The company, as trustee, had guaranteed a loan from a third party and also granted that third party first option on several apartments.

Deep Purple was, and still is, a rock music band. Its members included Mr Gillan, Mr Glover and Mr Paice. In 2005, band members entered into an agreement with HEC Enterprises Limited (HEC) and Deep Purple (Overseas) Limited (DPO). Under that agreement, the parties agreed to form a new company named Purpletuity, to which various copyrights and other assets were to be transferred. In 2015, Mr Gillan, Mr Glover and Mr Paice commenced proceedings against HEC and DPO to enforce that agreement.

In Mclean v Trustees of the Bankruptcy Estate of Dent [2016] EWHC 2650, the High Court considered the application of the equitable doctrines of marshalling and subrogation in relation to a fixed charge over (among other things) a dog.

A company and partnership borrowed funds from two sources – Barclays Bank and Lady Morrison. Barclays held, among other things, charges over farms owned by individual partners and an agricultural charge under the Agricultural Credits Act 1928 (UK), including a charge over a dog. Lady Morrison only held charges over the farms.

Changes may be coming to the Bankruptcy Code’s safe harbor provisions.[1] In 2012 the American Bankruptcy Institute established a Commission to Study the Reform of Chapter 11 (the “ABI Commission”), composed of many well-respected restructuring practitioners, including two of the original drafters of the Bankruptcy Code, whose advice holds great weight in the restructuring community.

A bankruptcy judge in the Southern District of New York recently held that section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code does not prevent a debtor’s creditors from bringing state-law fraudulent conveyance actions that challenge a leveraged buyout of the debtor. Weisfelner v. Fund 1 (In re Lyondell Chem. Co.), No. 10-4609 (REG), --- B.R. ----, 2014 WL 118036 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Jan. 14, 2014).

TheLehman Brothers bankruptcy court has determined that the contractually specified methodology for conducting the liquidation of a swap agreement is protected by the safe harbor provisions of the bankruptcy, even if the selected methodology would be more favorable to the non-defaulting counterparty than the liquidation methodology that would apply absent the bankruptcy.See Michigan State Housing Dev. Auth. v. Lehman Bros. Deriv. Prods. Inc. (In re Lehman Bros. Holdings Inc.), No. 08-13555, ---B.R.

A Western District of New York bankruptcy court has held that the safe harbor provisions of section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code apply to leveraged buy-outs of privately held securities. See Cyganowski v. Lapides (In re Batavia Nursing Home, LLC), No. 12-1145 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. July 29, 2013).

On June 25, 2013, the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York (the “Court”) issued a memorandum decision in the Lehman Brothers SIPA proceeding¹ holding that claims asserted by certain repurchase agreement (“repo”) counterparties (the “Representative Claimants”) did not qualify for treatment as customer claims under SIPA.

On February 10, 2011, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of New York issued a memorandum decision addressing whether the alleged holder of a mortgage loan had sufficient status as a secured creditor to seek relief from the automatic stay to pursue a foreclosure action.1 After resolving the primary issue in controversy on purely procedural grounds and granting the requested relief, the Court analyzed whether an entity that acquires its interest in a mortgage loan through an assignment from Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc.