In Fielding v The Burnden Group Limited (BGL) the English High Court dismissed an application for the liquidator to be held personally liable for the costs of a successful appeal against the rejection of a proof of debt.
In the UK case of CFL Finance Limited v Rubin and Ors, a creditor had sought to make an individual bankrupt. A creditors' meeting was held. At the meeting, a proposal for an Individual Voluntary Arrangement was approved by the creditor that held the largest portion of debt (and therefore 90.43% of the vote). The other two creditors voted against the proposal.
In this English case, a secured lender (Nationwide) appointed administrators to three companies. However, before appointing, Nationwide had:
In Day v The Official Assignee as Liquidator of GN Networks Ltd (in Liq) [2016] NZHC 2400, the High Court rejected a claim that the funding arrangement at issue constituted maintenance or champerty.
T he recent—and unexpected—rejection by a U.S. Bankruptcy Court of the modified plan of reorganization of Washington Mutual, Inc. (“WaMu”)2 on the ground of a “colorable claim” of insider trading has raised questions about the standards of conduct for members of ad hoc creditors committees during corporate reorganizations.3 In WaMu, Judge Mary F.
The trading rules and conventions of the loan market are well known to its participants. Similarly, the laws and practices governing equity securities trading in the U.S. are quite familiar to securities market professionals. The opportunity for confusion may arise, however, when these two markets quickly converge—for example, when the loans of a reorganized borrower are converted into or satisfied by the issuance of equity securities.