On June 29, 2015, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the decision of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York, which held that claims asserted by counterparties in relation to bilateral repurchase agreements do not qualify for treatment as customer claims under the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970 (“SIPA”).

In a May 4, 2015 opinion¹ , the United States Supreme Court held that a bankruptcy court order denying confirmation of a chapter 13 repayment plan is not a final order subject to immediate appeal. The Supreme Court found that, in contrast to an order confirming a plan or dismissing a case, an order denying confirmation of a plan neither alters the status quo nor fixes the rights and obligations of the parties. Although the decision arose in the context of a chapter 13 plan, it should apply with equal force to chapter 11 cases.

On May 21, 2015, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed a decision of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware, which had approved the structured dismissal of the Chapter 11 cases of Jevic Holding Corp., et al. The Court of Appeals first held that structured dismissals are not prohibited by the Bankruptcy Code, and then upheld the structured dismissal in the Jevic case, despite the fact that the settlement embodied in the structured dismissal order deviated from the Bankruptcy Code’s priority scheme.

In a memorandum decision dated May 4, 2015, Judge Vincent L. Briccetti of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York affirmed the September 2014 decision of Judge Robert D. Drain of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York, confirming the joint plans of reorganization (the “Plan”) in the Chapter 11 cases of MPM Silicones LLC and its affiliates (“Momentive”). Appeals were taken on three separate parts of Judge Drain’s confirmation decision, each of which ultimately was affirmed by the district court:

In In re Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC (“Madoff”),1 the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reaffirmed  its broad and literal interpretation of section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code, which provides a  safe harbor for transfers made in connection with a securities contract that might otherwise be  attacked as preferences or fraudulent transfers.

The Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York recently held in Edward S. Weisfelner, as Litigation Trustee of the LB Creditor Trust v. Fund 1., et al.

In a case of importance to foreign representatives of foreign debtors seeking the assistance of US courts pursuant to chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code, the US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has held that the debtor eligibility requirements of section 109(a) of the US Bankruptcy Code apply in cases under chapter 15 as they would in cases under other chapters of the Bankruptcy Code. The decision in Drawbridge Special Opportunities Fund LP v. Barnet (In re Barnet), Case No. 13-612 (2d Cir. Dec.

The world is getting smaller. The number of people who hop from country to country throughout their lives is increasing. Inevitably, when a jet-setting life becomes financially troubled, bankruptcy and other court proceedings are likely to be similarly international. Two cases involving the same parties were heard in both the High Court in London and the US Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York. See Kemsley v Barclays Bank Plc & Ors [2013] EWHC 1274 (Ch) (15 May 2013), 2013 WL 1904308, and In re Kemsley, 489 B.R. 346 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2013).

On April 16, 2013, in Morning Mist Holdings Ltd. v. Krys (In re Fairfield Sentry Ltd.),¹ the US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit issued an important decision informing fundamental concepts of cross-border insolvency law as implemented pursuant to Chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code.

There is something positively Dickensian when looking at the anti-deprivation rule (the "rule") and images come up of scribes working in dark and dismal rooms scratching their quills by dim candle light. Indeed, the rule dates back to the nineteenth century and many lawyers would be hard-pressed to explain it even if they are able to grasp the contradictions and fine distinctions thrown up by the old cases. In essence, the rule provides that a contractual provision is void if it provides for the transfer of an asset from the owner to a third party upon the insolvency of the owner.