On June 29, 2015, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the decision of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York, which held that claims asserted by counterparties in relation to bilateral repurchase agreements do not qualify for treatment as customer claims under the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970 (“SIPA”).
In a May 4, 2015 opinion1 , the United States Supreme Court held that a bankruptcy court order denying confirmation of a chapter 13 repayment plan is not a final order subject to immediate appeal. The Supreme Court found that, in contrast to an order confirming a plan or dismissing a case, an order denying confirmation of a plan neither alters the status quo nor fixes the rights and obligations of the parties. Although the decision arose in the context of a chapter 13 plan, it should apply with equal force to chapter 11 cases.
On May 21, 2015, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed a decision of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware, which had approved the structured dismissal of the Chapter 11 cases of Jevic Holding Corp., et al. The Court of Appeals first held that structured dismissals are not prohibited by the Bankruptcy Code, and then upheld the structured dismissal in the Jevic case, despite the fact that the settlement embodied in the structured dismissal order deviated from the Bankruptcy Code’s priority scheme.
In a memorandum decision dated May 4, 2015, Judge Vincent L. Briccetti of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York affirmed the September 2014 decision of Judge Robert D. Drain of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York, confirming the joint plans of reorganization (the “Plan”) in the Chapter 11 cases of MPM Silicones LLC and its affiliates (“Momentive”). Appeals were taken on three separate parts of Judge Drain’s confirmation decision, each of which ultimately was affirmed by the district court:
In In re Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC (“Madoff”),1 the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reaffirmed its broad and literal interpretation of section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code, which provides a safe harbor for transfers made in connection with a securities contract that might otherwise be attacked as preferences or fraudulent transfers.
The lead-participant relationship arising from a loan participation has become a fairly contentious one over the last two years as the interests of the two have diverged. For example, loan participants that may be in a troubled condition are never terribly anxious to hear that the lead bank has obtained a current appraisal of the primary collateral. Likewise, a strong loan participant my push a weak lead bank to take more decisive action regarding collecting the loan and possibly foreclosing on the collateral.
One of the most dramatic tools a lender can use in the collection of a loan is the involuntary bankruptcy case. It is dramatic because of the implications for both the debtor and the lender who files the case.
The Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York recently held in Edward S. Weisfelner, as Litigation Trustee of the LB Creditor Trust v. Fund 1., et al.
In a case of importance to foreign representatives of foreign debtors seeking the assistance of US courts pursuant to chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code, the US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has held that the debtor eligibility requirements of section 109(a) of the US Bankruptcy Code apply in cases under chapter 15 as they would in cases under other chapters of the Bankruptcy Code. The decision in Drawbridge Special Opportunities Fund LP v. Barnet (In re Barnet), Case No. 13-612 (2d Cir. Dec.
One of the ironic issues for failing banks has been the fact that banks that they have had to continue to deal with their borrowers and depositors in the ordinary course of business even though they are already in the queue for resolution by the FDIC. So for example, loans continue to get renewed and documents executed. What happens if you renew a loan shortly before the bank fails, do you have some sort of defense to enforcement of the loan when the successor bank or the FDIC makes demand on you?