On October 3, 2017, Bankruptcy Judge Laurie Selber Silverstein of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware issued a decision holding that the Bankruptcy Court had constitutional authority to approve third-party releases in a final order confirming a plan of reorganization.

On 28 March 2017, the Enactment of Extra-Statutory Concessions Order 2017[3] was made which, amongst other things, enacts ESC3.20. The Order came into force on 6 April 2017.

ESC3.20 disapplied the clawback of input tax credit for an insolvent business that has not paid (or not fully paid) the consideration for a supply. New section 26AA of the Value Added Tax Act 1994 gives broadly the same effect as ESC3.20 in that it “turns off” the disallowance of input tax in cases of non-payment of consideration if:

In less than a week after its bankruptcy filing, a debtor was able to obtain confirmation of its prepackaged plan of reorganization in the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York. In allowing the case to be confirmed on a compressed timeframe that was unprecedented for cases filed in the Southern District of New York, the Bankruptcy Court held that the 28-day notice period for confirmation of a chapter 11 plan could run coextensively with the period under which creditor votes on the plan were solicited prior to the commencement of the bankruptcy case.

On 11 October 2016, the High Court10 held that statutory interest payable on an insolvency (under rule 2.88(7) IR 1986) is not “yearly interest” for UK tax purposes. Such statutory interest is therefore not subject to UK withholding tax (20%).

The facts of the case are somewhat unusual in that there was a substantial surplus in the administration and the statutory interest was estimated at £5bn. However the decision is a welcome clarification of the position. It also confirms HMRC’s previous guidance on the taxation of statutory interest (subsequently withdrawn).

On 29 November 2016, the First-tier Tribunal9 held that the issue of growth shares to certain key employees had inadvertently caused an existing class of ordinary shares to carry a preferential right to assets on a winding up. The effect of this was that both prior ordinary share issues, and future share issues, failed to meet the requirement of the Enterprise Investment Scheme (EIS) rules.

The law on debt restructurings and liability management is back to where it was. Yesterday, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the controversial District Court decisions in the Marblegate-Education Management bondholder litigation. The case attracted wide-spread attention in financial markets, and we discussed it in an earlier client alert.

On 17 June 2016, the First-tier Tribunal (in Farnborough Airport Properties Ltd v HMRC²) held that the appointment of a receiver over a (would-be surrendering) group company meant that “arrangements” were in place for the company to no longer be under the same “control” as would-be claimant group companies.

In a June 3, 2016 decision¹ , the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware (“the Bankruptcy Court”) invalidated, on federal public policy grounds, a provision in the debtorLLC’s operating agreement that it viewed as hindering the LLC’s right to file for bankruptcy. Such provision provided that the consent of all members of the LLC, including a creditor holding a so-called “golden share” received pursuant to a forbearance agreement, was required for the debtor to commence a voluntary bankruptcy case.

In its recently issued decision in Husky International Electronics, Inc. v. Ritz, a 7-1 majority of the Supreme Court has clarified that intentionally fraudulent transfers designed to hinder or defraud creditors can fall within the definition of “actual fraud” under Section 523(a)(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code and can sometimes result in corresponding liabilities being non-dischargeable in a personal bankruptcy proceeding.¹

In a March 29, 2016 decision,1 the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit (the "Court of Appeals") held that creditors are preempted from asserting state law constructive fraudulent conveyance claims by virtue of the Bankruptcy Code's "safe harbors" that, among other things, exempt transfers made in connection with a contract for the purchase, sale or loan of a security (here, in the context of a leveraged buyout ("LBO")), from being clawed back into the bankruptcy estate for distribution to creditors.