On October 17, 2022, Justice Andrea Masley of the NY Supreme Court issued a decision and order denying all but one of the motion to dismiss claims filed by Boardriders, Oaktree Capital (an equity holder, term lender, and “Sponsor” under the credit agreement), and an ad hoc group of lenders (the “Participating Lenders”) that participated in an “uptiering” transaction that included new money investments and roll-ups of existing term loan debt into new priming debt that would sit at the top of the company’s capital structure.

On October 14, 2022, the Fifth Circuit issued its decision in Ultra Petroleum, granting favorable outcomes to “unimpaired” creditors that challenged the company’s plan of reorganization and argued for payment (i) of a ~$200 million make-whole and (ii) post-petition interest at the contractual rate, not the Federal Judgment Rate. At issue on appeal was the Chapter 11 plan proposed by the “massively solvent” debtors—Ultra Petroleum Corp. (HoldCo) and its affiliates, including subsidiary Ultra Resources, Inc.

On July 6, Delaware Bankruptcy Court Judge Craig T. Goldblatt issued a memorandum opinion in the bankruptcy cases of TPC Group, Inc., growing the corpus of recent court decisions tackling “uptiering” and other similar transactions that have been dubbed by some practitioners and investors as “creditor-on-creditor violence.” This topic has been a hot button issue for a few years, playing out in a number of high profile scenarios, from J.Crew and Travelport to Serta Simmons and TriMark, among others.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit recently held that loans incurred by a debtor to pay university tuition were “qualified education loans” under the Bankruptcy Code and thus were not dischargeable.

In so ruling, the Sixth Circuit rejected the debtor’s arguments that:

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit recently held that property in which a debtor’s dependent son lived part-time with his father qualified for the so-called homestead exemption contained in section 522(d)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code, regardless of state law.

On August 26, 2020, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that the Bankruptcy Code does not require subordination agreements to be strictly enforced in order for a court to confirm a cramdown plan, so long as the plan does not discriminate unfairly.

In a case of first impression on the issue of “whether a lease assumption can survive discharge even though it is not reaffirmed[,]” the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit recently held that a creditor’s post-discharge attempt to collect the balance owed under an automobile lease assumed by the debtor post-petition but prior to discharge in a Chapter 7 case did not violate the discharge injunction.

The U.S. Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the Eighth Circuit recently reversed a bankruptcy court’s disallowance of postpetition interest at the default contract rate, holding that “the bankruptcy court erred in applying a liquidated damages analysis and ruling the default interest rate was an unenforceable penalty,” and also erred in weighing “equitable considerations” to avoid enforcing the contractual default interest rate.

The U.S. Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the Eighth Circuit recently affirmed a bankruptcy court’s holding that the contemporaneous exchange for new value defense to a preference action under § 547(c) applied to a creditor bank that released its liens for less than full payment.

In so ruling, the Eighth Circuit BAP held that the bankruptcy trustee could not recover two of the three payments that the debtor made to the bank during the 90-day pre-petition preference period.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit recently rejected a loan servicer’s appeal from a Bankruptcy Appellate Panel’s ruling to remand to the lower bankruptcy court a punitive damages award for alleged discharge violations.

In so ruling, the Court held that it lacked appellate jurisdiction regarding the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel’s ruling as to the punitive damages award, but affirmed the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel’s denial of the debtors’ motion for appellate attorney’s fees.