Following a High Court decision of 1 November 2017 , it seems that the High Court will assess an objection by a secured creditor to a personal insolvency arrangement (PIA) differently depending on whether the creditor is a bank (or other originating lender) or a loan purchaser that is not a bank.
On October 3, 2017, Bankruptcy Judge Laurie Selber Silverstein of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware issued a decision holding that the Bankruptcy Court had constitutional authority to approve third-party releases in a final order confirming a plan of reorganization.
In this regular briefing, we summarise recent cases, developments and trends relevant to the ongoing efforts to resolve the mortgage arrears crisis.
CASELAW
Personal Insolvency
A series of recent cases have shed further light on factors that a Court will take into account when hearing a debtor’s appeal of a secured creditor’s decision to reject a proposed Personal Insolvency Arrangement (PIA) under the Personal Insolvency Act 2012 (the 2012 Act).
In less than a week after its bankruptcy filing, a debtor was able to obtain confirmation of its prepackaged plan of reorganization in the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York. In allowing the case to be confirmed on a compressed timeframe that was unprecedented for cases filed in the Southern District of New York, the Bankruptcy Court held that the 28-day notice period for confirmation of a chapter 11 plan could run coextensively with the period under which creditor votes on the plan were solicited prior to the commencement of the bankruptcy case.
The law on debt restructurings and liability management is back to where it was. Yesterday, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the controversial District Court decisions in the Marblegate-Education Management bondholder litigation. The case attracted wide-spread attention in financial markets, and we discussed it in an earlier client alert.
In a June 3, 2016 decision1 , the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware (“the Bankruptcy Court”) invalidated, on federal public policy grounds, a provision in the debtorLLC’s operating agreement that it viewed as hindering the LLC’s right to file for bankruptcy. Such provision provided that the consent of all members of the LLC, including a creditor holding a so-called “golden share” received pursuant to a forbearance agreement, was required for the debtor to commence a voluntary bankruptcy case.
In its recently issued decision in Husky International Electronics, Inc. v. Ritz, a 7-1 majority of the Supreme Court has clarified that intentionally fraudulent transfers designed to hinder or defraud creditors can fall within the definition of “actual fraud” under Section 523(a)(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code and can sometimes result in corresponding liabilities being non-dischargeable in a personal bankruptcy proceeding.1
In a March 29, 2016 decision,1 the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit (the "Court of Appeals") held that creditors are preempted from asserting state law constructive fraudulent conveyance claims by virtue of the Bankruptcy Code's "safe harbors" that, among other things, exempt transfers made in connection with a contract for the purchase, sale or loan of a security (here, in the context of a leveraged buyout ("LBO")), from being clawed back into the bankruptcy estate for distribution to creditors.
This briefing summarises recent legislation, cases and trends relevant to ongoing efforts to resolve the mortgage arrears crisis.
Recent Legislation
Recent legal and regulatory developments relevant to the mortgage arrears crisis have included:
On 29 January 2016, the Irish bankruptcy term was reduced from 3 years to 1 year. This Briefing sets out further detail, and summarises recent developments in the area of bankruptcy and personal insolvency.
BACKGROUND: