On October 20, 2017, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit issued a decision which, among other things,[1] affirmed the lower courts’ holding that certain noteholders were not entitled to payment of a make-whole premium. The Second Circuit held that the make-whole premium only was due in the case of an optional redemption, and not in the case of an acceleration brought about by a bankruptcy filing.
On October 20, 2017, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit issued an important decision regarding the manner in which interest must be calculated to satisfy the cramdown requirements in a chapter 11 case.[1] The Second Circuit sided with Momentive’s senior noteholders and found that “take back” paper issued pursuant to a chapter 11 plan should bear a market rate of interest when the market rate can be ascerta
On October 3, 2017, Bankruptcy Judge Laurie Selber Silverstein of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware issued a decision holding that the Bankruptcy Court had constitutional authority to approve third-party releases in a final order confirming a plan of reorganization.
A significant decision issued last week by a five judge bench of the Inner House has reversed a 40 year old decision on the meaning of 'effectually executed diligence' in a receivership.
Section 60 of the Insolvency Act 1986 provides that in a receivership, all persons who have 'effectually executed diligence' on any part of the property of the company which is subject to the charge by which the receiver is appointed have priority over the holder of the floating charge.
In less than a week after its bankruptcy filing, a debtor was able to obtain confirmation of its prepackaged plan of reorganization in the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York. In allowing the case to be confirmed on a compressed timeframe that was unprecedented for cases filed in the Southern District of New York, the Bankruptcy Court held that the 28-day notice period for confirmation of a chapter 11 plan could run coextensively with the period under which creditor votes on the plan were solicited prior to the commencement of the bankruptcy case.
The law on debt restructurings and liability management is back to where it was. Yesterday, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the controversial District Court decisions in the Marblegate-Education Management bondholder litigation. The case attracted wide-spread attention in financial markets, and we discussed it in an earlier client alert.
An opinion issued this week is the first examination by a Scottish court of the principle of 'modified universalism' and the requirements for an enforceable floating charge where all the company's property is situated in a non-UK jurisdiction.
This opinion by Lord Tyre in the Court of Session concerns three companies incorporated in Scotland, but which carried on business in India.
In a June 3, 2016 decision1 , the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware (“the Bankruptcy Court”) invalidated, on federal public policy grounds, a provision in the debtorLLC’s operating agreement that it viewed as hindering the LLC’s right to file for bankruptcy. Such provision provided that the consent of all members of the LLC, including a creditor holding a so-called “golden share” received pursuant to a forbearance agreement, was required for the debtor to commence a voluntary bankruptcy case.
In its recently issued decision in Husky International Electronics, Inc. v. Ritz, a 7-1 majority of the Supreme Court has clarified that intentionally fraudulent transfers designed to hinder or defraud creditors can fall within the definition of “actual fraud” under Section 523(a)(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code and can sometimes result in corresponding liabilities being non-dischargeable in a personal bankruptcy proceeding.1
In a March 29, 2016 decision,1 the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit (the "Court of Appeals") held that creditors are preempted from asserting state law constructive fraudulent conveyance claims by virtue of the Bankruptcy Code's "safe harbors" that, among other things, exempt transfers made in connection with a contract for the purchase, sale or loan of a security (here, in the context of a leveraged buyout ("LBO")), from being clawed back into the bankruptcy estate for distribution to creditors.