In a May 4, 2015 opinion¹ , the United States Supreme Court held that a bankruptcy court order denying confirmation of a chapter 13 repayment plan is not a final order subject to immediate appeal. The Supreme Court found that, in contrast to an order confirming a plan or dismissing a case, an order denying confirmation of a plan neither alters the status quo nor fixes the rights and obligations of the parties. Although the decision arose in the context of a chapter 13 plan, it should apply with equal force to chapter 11 cases.

On May 21, 2015, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed a decision of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware, which had approved the structured dismissal of the Chapter 11 cases of Jevic Holding Corp., et al. The Court of Appeals first held that structured dismissals are not prohibited by the Bankruptcy Code, and then upheld the structured dismissal in the Jevic case, despite the fact that the settlement embodied in the structured dismissal order deviated from the Bankruptcy Code’s priority scheme.

In a memorandum decision dated May 4, 2015, Judge Vincent L. Briccetti of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York affirmed the September 2014 decision of Judge Robert D. Drain of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York, confirming the joint plans of reorganization (the “Plan”) in the Chapter 11 cases of MPM Silicones LLC and its affiliates (“Momentive”). Appeals were taken on three separate parts of Judge Drain’s confirmation decision, each of which ultimately was affirmed by the district court:

Generally with a winding-up petition, if the petitioner is successful in obtaining a winding-up order, the petitioner will have its costs of the  proceedings. If, on the other hand, the petition is dismissed, then the petitioner has been  unsuccessful and it should pay the costs of the proceedings. We explore the Companies Court’s  treatment of costs in three recent decisions below.

From what Assets should a Petitioner have its Costs?

Under Hong Kong law, the courts’ jurisdiction is ordinarily territorial in nature. A plaintiff or applicant has to obtain permission (“leave”) of the court before it can validly serve a writ or other document initiating a legal action on a defendant or respondent located outside Hong Kong. For actions begun by writ, the procedures and criteria for applications for leave in this respect are set out under Order 11 of the Rules of the High Court (“RHC”).

Dealing a major blow to the trustee’s efforts to recover fraudulent transfers on behalf of the bankruptcy estate of the company run by Bernard Madoff, Judge Jed S. Rakoff of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York held in SIPC v. Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC¹ that the Bankruptcy Code cannot be used to recover fraudulent transfers of funds that occur entirely outside the United States.

Did you know that a liquidator of a foreign company may seek the assistance of the Hong Kong Court to obtain orders for the production of information which orders are, in substance, of the type made in Hong Kong windings-up under section 221(3) of the Companies (Winding-up and Miscellaneous Provisions) Ordinance?

As we pointed out in our Legal Update of 30 January 2014 ("New Companies Ordinance – Old Winding Up and Insolvency Regime"), the new Companies Ordinance for Hong Kong (Chapter 622) is scheduled to take effect from 3 March 2014 but it will not cover the winding-up and insolvency regime.

In the bankruptcy proceedings in respect of Mr Gabriel Ricardo Dias-Azedo (the "Bankrupt"), the Court of First Instance recently exercised its discretion under sections 37(2) and 97 of the Bankruptcy Ordinance (Cap. 6) (BO) in favour of two creditors and granted them a priority claim against the Bankrupt's estate for their costs in preserving his assets incurred before receiving notice of the bankruptcy petition.

Background

In the recent case of Lau Siu Hung v. Krzystof Marszalek (HCCW 484/2009, 17 June 2013) the Court of First Instance held that an annulment of bankruptcy does not debar a creditor, who has not proved his provable debt, from asserting his claim after the annulment.

Procedural Background