Un emprunteur qui, sans en avoir le droit, ne paierait pas l'échéance d'un crédit entre le 12 mars 2020 et l'expiration d'un délai d'un mois à compter de la date de cessation de l'état d'urgence sanitaire (lui-même censé durer deux mois à compter du 24 mars 2020 sauf report), pourrait arguer que la clause d'exigibilité anticipée du crédit et la clause d'intérêts de retard (une clause pénale) ne pourront produire leurs effets qu'à compter de l'expiration de cette période en application de l'ordonnance n° 2020-306 du 25 mars 2020 prise en application de la loi d'urgence n° 2020-290 du 23 mars

A borrower who, without having the right to do so, would not pay a credit instalment due between 12 March 2020 and one month after the end of the state of health emergency (which is supposed to last two months as from 24 March 2020 but could be extended), could argue that the loan documents' acceleration clause and default interest clause (a liquidated damage clause) shall only take effect after that period pursuant to Ordinance No. 2020-306 of 25 March 2020, adopted further to the "emergency" Law No. 2020-290 of 23 March 2020.

A borrower who, without having the right to do so, would not pay a credit instalment due between 12 March 2020 and one month after the end of the state of health emergency (which is supposed to last two months as from 24 March 2020 but could be extended), could argue that the loan documents' acceleration clause and default interest clause (a liquidated damage clause) shall only take effect after that period pursuant to Ordinance No. 2020-306 of 25 March 2020, adopted further to the "emergency" Law No. 2020-290 of 23 March 2020.

At first blush, it may seem counterintuitive for financiers to compete to provide loans to debtor companies that have just filed for protection under an insolvency or restructuring procedure, but they have been proven to do so on a large scale in US Chapter 11 cases and for a variety of reasons, whether to protect an existing loan position or taking an opportunity to garner significant, safe returns as a new lender.

In In re KB Toys Inc.,¹ the US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the holdings of the lower courts that claims subject to disallowance under Section 502(d) of the Bankruptcy Code are “similarly disallowable in the hands of the subsequent transferee.” According to the Third Circuit, when a creditor owes property to the estate, until that property is returned to the estate, that creditor’s claim, regardless of who holds it, is impaired, and the subsequent sale of that c

On April 16, 2013, in Morning Mist Holdings Ltd. v. Krys (In re Fairfield Sentry Ltd.),¹ the US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit issued an important decision informing fundamental concepts of cross-border insolvency law as implemented pursuant to Chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code.

On May 4, 2012, the Delaware bankruptcy court inIn re KB Toys, Inc., et al. (KB Toys), handed down a thoughtful decision addressing the issue of whether impairments attach to a claim or remain with its seller. The KB Toys court held that “a claim in the hands of a transferee has the same rights and disabilities as the claim had in the hands of the original claimant. Disabilities attach to and travel with the claim.”

In the course of the next few weeks, Omega Navigation Enterprises, Inc. and its affiliates (collectively, “Omega”), an international shipping enterprise, will find out if motions by certain of their lenders to, among other things, dismiss Omega’s chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings have been granted by the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Texas.¹ If not, then Omega may be permitted to continue its attempt to reorganize its business under chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code.

The Bankruptcy Court for the District of Massachusetts recently issued an opinion in In re SW Boston Hotel Venture, LLC¹ in which it found, among other things, that the assignment of voting rights from a junior creditor to a senior creditor pursuant to an intercreditor agreement was unenforceable. The opinion was rendered in connection with the court’s decision to confirm the plan proposed by the debtor, the owner of the W Hotel in Boston.

Background

The District Court for the Southern District of New York recently issued an opinion in Picard v. Katz, et al., (In re Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC),1 which limits avoidance actions against a debtor-broker’s customers to those arising under federal law based on actual, rather than constructive, fraud. The decision was issued by US District Judge Rakoff in the Trustee’s suit against the owners of the New York Mets (along with certain of their friends, family and associates).