In bankruptcy as in federal jurisprudence generally, to characterize something with the near-epithet of “federal common law” virtually dooms it to rejection.
In January 2020 we reported that, after the reconsideration suggested by two Supreme Court justices and revisions to account for the Supreme Court’s Merit Management decision,[1] the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit stood by its origina
It seems to be a common misunderstanding, even among lawyers who are not bankruptcy lawyers, that litigation in federal bankruptcy court consists largely or even exclusively of disputes about the avoidance of transactions as preferential or fraudulent, the allowance of claims and the confirmation of plans of reorganization. However, with a jurisdictional reach that encompasses “all civil proceedings . . .
I don’t know if Congress foresaw, when it enacted new Subchapter V of Chapter 11 of the Code[1] in the Small Business Reorganization Act of 2019 (“SBRA”), that debtors in pending cases would seek to convert or redesignate their cases as Subchapter V cases when SBRA became effective on February 19, 2020, but it was foreseeable.
Our February 26 post [1] reported on the first case dealing with the question whether a debtor in a pending Chapter 11 case may redesignate it as a case under Subchapter V, [2] the new subchapter of Chapter 11 adopted by the Small Business Reorganization Act of 2019 (“SBRA”), which became effective on February 19.
Our February 26 post entitled “SBRA Springs to Life”[1] reported on the first case known to me that dealt with the issue whether a debtor in a pending Chapter 11 case should be permitted to amend its petition to designate it as a case under Subchapter V,[2] the new subchapter of Chapter 11 adopted by
State governments can be creditors of individuals, businesses and institutions that are debtors in bankruptcy in a variety of ways, most notably as tax and fine collectors but also as lenders. They can also be debtors of debtors, in their role, for example, as the purchasers of vast quantities of goods and services on credit. And they can also be transferees of a debtor’s property in (at least) every role in which they can be creditors.
We have noodled on the impact that the Supreme Court’s decision in Merit Management Group, LP v.
——新修订将如何影响上市公司重组
作为打击壳股活动的一系列举措之一,香港联合交易所有限公司(以下简称“联交所”)修订了《香港联合交易所有限公司证券上市规则》(以下简称“《上市规则》”)中的大量条文,并发布了相关指引信。最新修订的条文于2019年10月1日生效,修订主要关于借壳上市和持续上市准则有关。其他已于2018年开始生效修订的条文与除牌机制和融资规则有关。除此之外,联交所逐渐加强了对新上市申请人的上市适合性审查。尽管这些修订主要针对壳股活动,但是也会影响其他重组活动,包括上市公司破产重组。
我们将在本文中分享对上述修订及其对上市公司破产重组的影响的看法。本文不讨论《上市规则》中所有经过修订的条文,仅关注某些会影响上市公司重组的特定条文。
除牌制度
在2018年8月以前,根据《上市规则》第17项应用指引的规定,除牌程序由三阶段组成。但在2018年8月以后,除牌程序简单化,上市公司持续停牌18个月,联交所即可将其除牌。
Whether because of, or in spite of, the proliferating case law it is hard to say, but the issues in, underlying and surrounding third-party releases in Chapter 11 plans just continue to arise with incessant regularity, albeit without a marked increase in clarity. We have posted about those issues here six times in little more than two years,[1] and it is fair to assume that this post will not be the last.