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The Royal Court has recently handed down the final decision in the matter of Eagle Holdings Limited (in compulsory liquidation).[1] In this decision, the Royal Court of Guernsey provided guidance and assistance to the joint liquidators regarding a distribution of surplus funds.

Historically, Guernsey's insolvency law had limited operational provisions (compared to English law) and was largely developed by a bespoke and flexible application of common and customary law principles by the Royal Court. The old regime will now be updated and revised by the Companies (Guernsey) Law, 2008 (Insolvency) (Amendment) Ordinance 2020 (Ordinance) which was passed on 15 January 2020. Although it does not yet have force of law it is anticipated to become law in the latter part of this year. 

The recognition of the powers of an English trustee in bankruptcy in Guernsey is generally pursued either by way of a letter of request issued by the foreign court pursuant to section 426 of the Insolvency Act 1986 (Insolvency Act) or by way of an application via the common or customary law.

Introduction

The recent decision from the Guernsey Royal Court in DM Property Holdings (Guernsey) Limited (in Liquidation)(1) is of fundamental importance to Guernsey insolvency practitioners as it provides cautionary guidance on the practical implications of Practice Direction 3/2015.

On January 17, 2017, in a long-awaited decision in Marblegate Asset Management, LLC v. Education Management Finance Corp.,1 the US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that Section 316 of the Trust Indenture Act ("TIA") does not prohibit an out of court restructuring of corporate bonds so long as an indenture's core payment terms are left intact.

Imagine that your partnership is on the cusp of concluding a large transaction which has the potential to be immensely profitable. The partnership agreement does not include a fixed term for the partnership, and can instead be terminated on one partner giving notice to the others (referred to as a “partnership at will”).

The US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has ruled that a lender’s security interest in accounts was not perfected because a reference to “proceeds” in the lender’s UCC financing statement did not expressly refer to “accounts.” The Sixth Circuit surprisingly interpreted the definition of “proceeds”1 in Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code to exclude “accounts”2 (despite and without reference to provisions of UCC Article 9 to the contrary).