On May 30, 2023, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed a bankruptcy court’s confirmation of a chapter 11 reorganization plan containing nonconsensual releases of direct claims against third-party non-debtors, including the debtor’s controlling owners, the Sacklers.
In In re Purdue Pharma, L.P., 1 U.S. District Court Judge Colleen McMahon of the Southern District of New York vacated Purdue Pharma’s confirmed plan of reorganization after finding that the bankruptcy court below did not have statutory authority to issue a confirmation order granting non-consensual third-party releases—namely for the benefit of the Sackler family, which owns Purdue.
On Dec. 16, 2021, U.S. District Court Judge Colleen McMahon in the Southern District of New York vacated Purdue Pharma’s confirmed plan of reorganization after finding that the Bankruptcy Court below did not have statutory authority to issue a confirmation order granting non-consensual third-party releases — namely for the benefit of the Sackler family who owns Purdue. In re Purdue Pharma, L.P., Case No. 7:21-cv-08566 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 16, 2021).
On Oct. 27, 2020, Judge Marvin Isgur for the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Texas held that (1) a make-whole premium was not interest or unmatured interest and thus not subject to disallowance, (2) a make-whole claim was enforceable as liquidated damages under New York law and (3) the solvent debtor exception survived the enactment of the Bankruptcy Code and the Noteholders were entitled to postpetition interest at the contractual default rate.
In its October 22, 2020, CNH Diversified Opportunities Master Account, L.P. v.
On January 17, 2017, in a long-awaited decision in Marblegate Asset Management, LLC v. Education Management Finance Corp.,1 the US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that Section 316 of the Trust Indenture Act ("TIA") does not prohibit an out of court restructuring of corporate bonds so long as an indenture's core payment terms are left intact.
The US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has ruled that a lender’s security interest in accounts was not perfected because a reference to “proceeds” in the lender’s UCC financing statement did not expressly refer to “accounts.” The Sixth Circuit surprisingly interpreted the definition of “proceeds”1 in Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code to exclude “accounts”2 (despite and without reference to provisions of UCC Article 9 to the contrary).