In vielen Branchen kann die Lieferkette eine Vielzahl von Unternehmen und Jurisdiktionen umfassen. Im derzeitigen Wirtschaftsklima ist es nicht ungewöhnlich, dass einzelne Lieferanten innerhalb dieser Lieferkette in finanzielle   Schwierigkeiten   geraten   oder ein Insolvenzverfahren beantragen.

In many industries, the supply chain can involve multiple suppliers and jurisdictions. In the current economic climate, it is not unusual for a supplier within the supply chain to encounter financial distress or even to enter into formal insolvency proceedings. This can have a significant impact on a company if its business depends on a distressed supplier and an alternative or additional supplier cannot be found (and production cannot be brought in house) or an alternative sourcing is not possible for other reasons, like part/raw material approval process, testing, customs etc.

Once again, we reflect on the prior year for restructuring trends impacting private credit lenders. Last year it was all about “liability management”—the latest trend in which the limits of sponsor-favorable loan documents are being tested, in some cases past the breaking point.

A common yet contentious liability management strategy is an “uptier” transaction, where lenders holding a majority of loans or notes under a financing agreement seek to elevate or “roll-up” the priority of their debt above the previously pari passu debt held by the non-participating minority lenders. In a recent decision in the Boardriders case, the minority lenders defeated a motion to dismiss various claims challenging an uptier transaction.

In an important decision to private credit lenders, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that a make-whole premium for an unsecured creditor tied to future interest payments is the “functional equivalent of unmatured interest” and not recoverable under Section 502(b)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code. Ultra Petroleum Corp. v. Ad Hoc Committee of OpCo Unsecured Creditors (In re Ultra Petroleum Corp.), No. 21-20008 (5th Cir. Oct. 14, 2022) (“Ultra”). Ordinarily, the story ends here.

Creditors of distressed businesses are often frustrated by shareholder-controlled boards when directors pursue strategies that appear to be designed to benefit shareholders at the creditors’ expense. In these circumstances, creditors might consider sending a letter to the board to convince the directors to pivot and adopt alternative strategies or face risk of liability for breaching fiduciary duties. The efficacy of this approach depends on many factors, including the company’s financial condition, the board’s composition and the underlying transactions at issue.

This past year was marked by extraordinary deal activity. Record breaking M&A activity drove record breaking private credit activity. Private equity M&A activity was at a substantial high, with over 8,500 deals worth $2.1 trillion, a 60% increase over 2020. Not surprisingly, in this environment, defaults were at all-time lows. The Proskauer Private Credit Default tracker showed an active default rate of approximately 1% at the end of 2021, compared to 3.6% in 2020.

Despite the Supreme Court’s rejection of a structured dismissal in 2017,[1] there is a growing trend of bankruptcy courts approving structured dismissals of chapter 11 cases following a successful sale of a debtor’s assets under Section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code.

The primary investment thesis of a private credit lender is simple — get the loan repaid at maturity. Private credit lenders do not make loans as a means to acquire their borrower’s business. There are circumstances, however, where private credit lenders must be prepared to take ownership when the borrower is distressed and there is no realistic prospect of near-term loan repayment. Becoming the owner of a borrower’s business may very well be the loan recovery option of last resort.

With each extension, the scope of the suspension of the obligation to file for insolvency which was first introduced in March 2020 became more and more limited.