Snippet series

What is the impact on the double Luxco and the Luxembourg share pledges?

Luxembourg bolsters its position for the structurings of international investments with the introduction of new tools for bankruptcy prevention. The existing and new financial collateral arrangements maintain their bankruptcy insolvency proceedings remote status, preserving the benefit and popularity of the double Luxco structure and the related enforcement of Luxembourg share security.

The effects of Brexit have had seismic consequences for all aspects of law, not just in the UK but in Europe more widely. This month we hear from four Loyens & Loeff team members specialising in insolvency and restructuring matters, who take a look at the corporate insolvency fallout for Luxembourg specifically. How have Schemes and restructuring plans been impacted by the UK’s exit from the EU, and what has it meant for enforceability of judgements?

This article deals with the insolvency concept of the center of main interests (COMI) under the European Union insolvency legislation, in particular Regulation 2015/848 on insolvency proceedings (the Insolvency Regulation or the Regulation).

Pursuant to the Insolvency Regulation COMI is one of the central unified and autonomous concepts¹ of the insolvent debtor, i.e. it is an insolvency concept and not a corporate law or tax concept.

The Colombian airline Aerovias Nacionales de Colombia S.A. – Avianca (“Avianca”) has made a habit of accessing the structured credit markets by monetizing its expected stream of credit card receivables, filing for U.S. Chapter 11 protection when in distress, and then challenging the structured credit agreements to which it had committed. Recently, Avianca reached a settlement with the lenders to its existing future flow receivables transaction, entered into in December 2017, which will result in a restructured loan facility.

Supply chain finance products have a well-deserved reputation of being fairly low risk propositions. The majority of facilities are uncommitted, exposures are typically short-term and many counterparties are highly rated and well capitalized.

In ordinary business circumstances, the directors/managers of a Luxembourg company have a duty to file for bankruptcy within one month of the meeting of the two criteria for bankruptcy (under threat of criminal sanction) – this is the so called “Insolvency Filing Obligation”. The two parts of the test for bankruptcy are: (i) cessation of payments (or so called missed creditor payment) and (ii) loss of creditworthiness.

Over the past several years, non-recourse receivables financing has been embraced by many major financial institutions and non-bank investors in the US market. With its (i) favorable regulatory treatment for regulated institutions, (ii) perceived positive risk/reward profile and (iii) adaptability to recent technological advancements such as distributed ledger technology (i.e., blockchain), non-recourse receivables financing likely will grow increasingly popular in the US market.

In In re Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC (“Madoff”),1 the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reaffirmed  its broad and literal interpretation of section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code, which provides a  safe harbor for transfers made in connection with a securities contract that might otherwise be  attacked as preferences or fraudulent transfers.

On August 11, 2009, the US Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York denied five motions to dismiss bankruptcy cases filed by certain bankruptcy remote, special purpose subsidiaries (SPEs) of General Growth Properties, Inc. (GGP). The motions were filed by or on behalf of secured lenders to the SPEs (Movants) who argued that the bankruptcy filings were inconsistent with the bankruptcy remote structures that they had negotiated with GGP.